Essay by
David.Steinberg@houseofdavid.ca
Home page http://www.houseofdavid.ca/
Note - I originally posted this small essay on Wikipedia.
1. Introduction
1. Introduction
The Government of India Act 1935 was the last pre-independence constitution of the British Raj.
The Government of India Act 1935 was the outcome
of a long constitutional development of which the mains stages were:
Government
of India Act 1858, under which India became a formal Crown colony and the British
government took over administrative functions from the British
East India Company, following the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857;
Government
of India Act 1909 which introduced the elective principle;
Government
of India Act 1919 which introduced provincial dyarchy i.e. some
“nation building” subjects, such as education, would be in the
hands of ministers commanding support in the provincial legislature while the
core subjects e.g. law and order and finance, were in the charge of officials
appointed by, and responsible to, the governor and ultimately to the British
Parliament;
Simon Commission which proposed
almost fully responsible
government in the provinces;
Indian Round Table Conferences 1931-1933 which agreed that
both Bitish India
and the Princely
States would be integrated into a eventual federated Dominion of India. However,
Congress and the Muslims were not able to reach any agreement on how this
federation should be structured i.e. how power was to be shared and how the
minority Mulsims were to be protected from Hindu persecution. This lack of
agreement left the Conservative-dominated
British government free to draft legislative proposals (the white paper) in line with its own
views;
A
joint select
committee, chaired by Lord Linlithgow, which reviewed the white
paper proposals at great length. On the basis of this white paper, the
Government of India Act, 1935 was framed. At the committee stage and later, to
appease the diehards, the
“safeguards” were strengthened and indirect elections, were
reinstated for the Federal Assembly (Lower House). Among other things, the Act
continued to deny Indians the right to draft, or modify, their
own constitution.
No Preamble
– The Ambiguity of Parliament’s Commitment to Dominion
Status
The
Government
of India Act 1919 had a Preamble explaining the overarching aim and
philosophy of the Act. The Preamble quoted, and centered on, the statement of
Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu (July 17, 1917 - March 19, 1922) to
the House of Commons on 20 August 1917 which pledged
”…the gradual development of self-governing institutions,
with a view to the progressive realization of responsible
government in India as an integral Part of the British Empire.”
Had
there been a Preamble, it would have had to have included the Viceroy Lord
Irwin’s statement of 31 October 1929 (see Gwyer & Appadorai pp. 224-225)-
”The
goal of British policy was stated in the declaration of August 1917 to be that
of providing for the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a
view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an
integral part of the British Empire…. I am authorized on behalf of His
Majesty's Government to state clearly that in their judgement it is implicit in
the declaration of 1917 that the natural issue of India's constitutional
progress, as there contemplated, is the attainment of Dominion Status.”
Once
the new Act had been passed Irwin’s statement would have become
Parliament’s commitment. However, many Conservative backbenchers, not
only the diehards, opposed granting India dominion status. To avoid a
confrontation, i.e. to fudge the issue, Sam Hoare, the Secretary
of State for India made the following statement to Parliament on 6
February 1935[1]
The House will observe that
the Bill, like most modern Bills, contains no Preamble. There have, it is true,
been important Acts in the past, among them the Government of India Act, 1919,
to which a statement of policy and intentions was prefixed. There is, however,
no need for a Preamble in this case, as no new pronouncement of policy or
intentions is required. The Preamble to the Act of 1919 was described by the
Joint Committee in their Report as ‘having set out finally and definitely
the ultimate aims of British rule in India'. The Committee, after full
consideration, further asserted that 'subsequent statements of policy have
added nothing to the substance of this declaration', which they then proceed to
quote in full in their Report as, in their own words, ‘settling once and
for all the attitude of the British Parliament and people towards the political
aspirations' of India…. Moreover, in government, and above all in the
government of the Indian Empire, continuity of policy is of the first
importance. No Government and no Parliament can treat lightly any statement
issued under the authority of their predecessors…. The position of the
Government therefore, is this: They stand firmly by the pledge contained in the
1919 Preamble, which it is not part of their plan to repeal, and by the
interpretation put by the Viceroy in 1929, on the authority of the Government
of the day, on that Preamble that 'the natural issue of India's progress as
there contemplated, is the attainment of Dominion Status'. The declaration of
1929 was made to remove doubts which had been felt as to the meaning of the Preamble
of 1919. There is, therefore, no need to enshrine in an Act words and phrases
which would add nothing new to the declaration of the Preamble.
Hoare’s statement
asserted his Government’s support for the Irwin declaration but did not
submit it to Parliament to receive parliamentary approval for its contents.
No Bill of Rights – Since the Federation, to be established under the Act, would
include autocratic princely States, no meaningful bill of rights could be
formulated. N.b. the draft outline constitution in the Nehru Report did include a bill
of rights.
Length
– The Government of India Act 1935 was the longest bill ever passed by
Parliament. A good constitution should clearly set out overarching principles,
not lawyers’ small print. The most successful constitution ever, that of
the USA, is only a few pages long. The reason for this length was
Parliament’s lack of trust of Indians and particularly Indian
politicians.
Relationship to a Dominion Constitution – In 1947, a relatively few amendments
in the Act made it the functioning interim constitutions of India and Pakistan.
Safeguards
– The Act was not only extremely detailed, but it was riddled with
‘safeguards’ designed to enable the British Government to intervene
whenever it saw the need in order to maintain British responsibilities and interests.
To achieve this, in the face of a gradually increasing Indianization of the
institutions of the Government of India, the Act concentrated the decision for
the use and the actual administration of the safeguards in the hands of the
British-appointed Viceroy and provincial governors who were subject to the
control of the Secretary
of State for India.
In
view of the enormous powers and responsibilities which the Governor-General
must exercise in his discretion or according to his individual judgment, it is
obvious that he (the Viceroy) is expected to be a kind of superman. He must
have tact, courage, and ability and be endowed with an infinite capacity for
hard work. "We have put into this Bill many safeguards," said Sir
Robert Horne … "but all of those safeguards revolve about a single
individual, and that is the Viceroy. He is the lynch-pin of the whole
system…. If the Viceroy fails, nothing can save the system you have set
up." This speech reflected the point of view of the die-hard Tories who were
horrified by the prospect that some day there might be a Viceroy appointed by a
Labor government. (Smith)
Reality
of Responsible
Government Under the Act – Is the cup Half-full or
Half-Empty?
A
close reading of the Act (see Shah 1937) reveals that the British Government equipped itself with the legal instruments to
take back total control at any time they considered this to be desirable.
However, doing so without good reason would totally sink their credibility with
. groups in India whose support the act was
aimed at securing. Some contrasting views -
“In the federal government … the semblance of responsible
government is presented. But the reality is lacking, for the powers in defence
and external affairs necessarily, as matters stand, given to the governor-general
limit vitally the scope of ministerial activity, and the measure of
representation given to the rulers of the Indian States negatives any possibility of even the beginings of democratic control.
It will be a matter of the utmost interest to watch the development of a form
of government so unique; certainly, if it operates successfully, the 'highest
credit will be due to the political capacity of Indian leaders, who have
infinitely more serious difficulties to face than had the colonial statesmen
who evolved the system of self-government which has now culminated in Dominion
status.”[2]
“Lord Lothian,
in a talk lasting forty-five minutes, came straight out with his view on the
Bill[3]:
I agree with the diehards
that it has been a surrender. You who are not used to any constitution cannot
realise what great power you are going to wield. If you look at the
constitution it looks as if all the powers are vested in the Governor-General
and the Governor. But is not every power here vested in the King? Everything is
done in the name of the King but does the King ever interfere? Once the power
passes into the hands of the legislature, the Governor or the Governor-General
is never going to interfere. . . . The Civil Service will be helpful. You too
will realise this. Once a policy is laid down they will carry it out loyally
and faithfully….
We could not help it. We
had to fight the diehards here. You could not realise what great courage has
been shown by Mr. Baldwin and Sir Samuel Hoare. We did not want to spare the
diehards as we had to talk in a different language….
These various meetings -
and in due course G.D. (Birla), before his return in September, met virtually
everyone of importance in Anglo-Indian affairs - confirmed G.D.'s original
opinion that the differences between the two countries were largely
psychological, the same proposals open to diametrically opposed
interpretations. He had not, probably, taken in before his visit how
considerable, in the eyes of British conservatives, the concessions had
been…. If nothing else, successive conversations made clear to G.D. that
the agents of the Bill had at least as heavy odds against them at home as they
had in India.
False Equivalences - "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as
the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread."
(from Anatole France in The Red Lily,
1894)
Ø
Under the Act, British
citizens resident in the UK and British companies registered in the UK must be
treated on the same basis as Indian citizens and Indian registered companies
unless UK law denies reciprocal treatment. The unfairness of this arrangement
is clear when one considers the dominant position of British capital in much of
the Indian modern sector and the complete dominance, maintained through unfair
commercial practices, of UK shipping interests in both India’s
international and coastal shipping traffic and the utter insignificance of
Indian capital in Britain and the non-existence of Indian involvement in
shipping to or within the UK. There are very detailed provisions requiring the
Viceroy to intervene if, in his unappealable view, any India law or regulation
is intended to, or will in fact, discriminate against UK resident British
subjects, British registered companies and, particularly, British shipping
interests.
“The
Joint Committee considered a suggestion that trade with foreign countries
should be made by the Minister of Commerce, but it decided that all
negotiations with foreign countries should be conducted by the Foreign Office
or Department of External Affairs as they are in the United Kingdom. In
concluding agreements of this character, the Foreign Secretary always consults
the Board of Trade and it was assumed that the Governor-General would in like
manner consult the Minister of Commerce in India. This may be true, but the
analogy itself is false. In the United Kingdom, both departments are subject to
the same legislative control, whereas in India one is responsible to the
federal legislature and the other to the Imperial Parliament.” (Smith)
British
Political Needs vs. Indian Constitutional Needs – the Ongoing Dysfunction
From
the Montagu statement of 1917, it was vital that the reform process stay ahead
of the curve if the British were to hold the strategic initiative. However,
imperialist sentiment, and a lack of realism, in British political circles made
this impossible. Thus the grudging conditional concessions of power in the Acts
of 1919 and 1935 caused more resentment and signally failed to win the Raj the
backing of influential groups in India which it desperately needed. In 1919 the
Act of 1935, or even the Simon
Commission plan would have been well received. There is evidence that
Montagu would have backed something of this sort but his cabinet colleagues
would not have considered it. By 1935, a constitution establishing a Dominion
of India, comprising the British Indian provinces might have been acceptable in
India though it would not have passed the British Parliament. As Moore wrote[4] -
“Considering the
balance of power in the Conservative party at the time, the passing of a Bill
more liberal than that which was enacted in 1935 is inconceivable.”
The provincial part of the Act, which went into
effect automatically, basically followed the recommendations of the Simon
Commission. Provincial dyarchy was abolished; i.e. all provincial
portfolios were to be placed in charge of ministers enjoying the support of the
provincial legislatures. The British-appointed provincial governors, who were
responsible to the British Government via the Viceroy and Secretary of State for India, were to
accept the recommendations of the ministers unless, in their view, they
negatively affected his areas of statutory “special
responsibilities” such as the prevention of any grave menace to the peace
or tranquility of a province and the safeguarding of the legitimate interests
of minorities. In the event of political
breakdown, the governor, under the supervision of the Viceroy, could take over
total control of the provincial government. This, in fact, allowed the
governors a more untrammeled control than any British official had enjoyed in
the history of the Raj. After the resignation of the congress provincial
ministries in 1939, the governors did directly rule the ex-Congress provinces
throughout the war.
It was generally recognized, that the provincial
part of the Act conferred a great deal of power and patronage to provincial
politicians as long as both British officials and Indian politicians played by
the rules. However, the paternalistic threat of the intervention by the British
governor rankled.
|
“Perhaps … the juggernaut of all-India federation might best have been set in motion by Britain entering into a compact with the great states and
framing the statute accordingly…. Francis Wylie, has written that 'only about six
of [the states] had any claim to serious consideration at all as potential
federal units'. Furthermore, in the absence of force 'there was never
the slightest chance of getting rulers representing fifty per cent of the
population of the princely states to sign instruments of accession' during the pre-war years…. “The weakness of the argument for a
bargain between British imperialism and Indian autocracy in the 1930s is the
assumption of its compatibility with responsible government
in the provinces. As early as March 1930 Watson had minuted
in the Political Department that
without 'the grant of constitutional government to the States'
subjects' a 'true Federal Scheme with British India seems impracticable'. Neither Gandhi's conception of Indian unity nor
Jawaharlal's understanding of freedom could be contained within British India. In order to explain the princes' failure to accede to the all-India federation it
is unnecessary, in the final
analysis, to look beyond the policies that the Congress developed
towards the states.” Moore 1974 pp.
304-305
|
Unlike the provincial portion of the Act, the
Federal portion was to go into effect only when half the States by weight
agreed to federate. This never happened
The Act provided for Dyarchy at the Centre. The
British Government, in the person of the Secretary of State for India, through
the Governor-General of India – Viceroy
of India, would continue to control India’s financial obligations,
defence, foreign affairs and the British Indian Army and would make the key
appointments to the Reserve Bank of India (exchange rates) and
Railway Board and the Act stipulated that no finance bill could be placed in
the Central Legislature without the consent of the Governor General. The funding
for the British responsibilities and foreign obligations (eg. loan repayments,
pensions), at least 80 percent of the federal expenditures, would be
non-votable and be taken off the top before any claims could be considered for
e.g. social or economic development programs. The Viceroy, under the
supervision of the Secretary of State for India, was provided with overriding
and certifying powers that could, theoretically have allowed him to rule
autocratically.
The federal
part of the Act was designed to meet the aims of the Conservative Party. Over
the very long term, the Conservative leadership expected the Act to lead to a
nominally dominion status India, conservative in outlook,
dominated by an alliance of Hindu princes, Muslims and right-wing Hindus which
would be well disposed to place itself under the guidance and protection of
Great Britain. In the medium-term, the
Act was expected to (in rough order of importance):
·
win the support of moderate
nationalists since it’s formal aim was to eventually lead to an Dominion
of India which, as defined under the Statute of Westminster 1931, virtually
equaled independence;
·
retain British of control
of the Indian Army, Indian finances and India’s foreign relations for
another generation;
win
Muslim support by conceding most of Jinnah's Fourteen Points;
·
convince the Princes to
join the Federation by giving the Princes conditions for entry never likely to
be equaled. It was expected that enough would join to allow the establishment
of the Federation. The terms offered to the Princes included:
o
The Princes would select
their state’s representatives in the Federal Legislature. There would be
no pressure for them to democratize their administrations or allow elections
for state’s representatives in the Federal Legislature;
o
The Princes would enjoy
heavy weightage. The Princely States represented about a quarter of the
population of India and produced well under a quarter of its wealth. Under the
Act:
o
The Upper House of the
Federal Legislature, the Council of State, would consist of 260 members (156
(60%) elected from the British India and 104 (40%) nominated by the rulers of
the princely states) and,
o
The Lower House, the
Federal Assembly, would consist of 375 members (250 (67%) elected by the
Legislative Assemblies of the British Indian provinces; 125 (33%) nominated by
the rulers of the princely states.)
ensure that the Congress could never
rule alone or gain enough seats to bring down the government. This was done by over-representing
the Princes, the Muslims and every possible minority and by making the
executive theoretically, but not practically, removable by the legislature;
·
weaken electoral support
for Congress by increasing the electorate. It was hoped that elements of the
“true India” would be enfranchised which would see their interests
in stability and cooperation with the British and so would reject the
westernized nationalist extremists;
induce the disintegration of
Congress as a cohesive national party. This would be accomplished by giving Indian
politicians a great deal of power at the provincial level, while denying them,
responsibility at the Centre, it was hoped that Congress, the only national
party, would disintegrate into a series of provincial fiefdoms and thus cease
to threaten the Raj at the Centre.
Viability
of the proposed Federation. It was hoped that the gerrymandered federation,
encompassing units of such hugely different sizes, sophistication and varying
in forms of government from autocratic Princely States to democratic provinces,
could provide the basis for a viable state. However, this was not a realistic
possiblity (see eg. The Making of India’s Paper Federation, 1927-35 in Moore 1988). In reality, the
Federation, as planned in the Act, almost certainly was not viable and would
have rapidly broken down with the British left to pick up the pieces without
any viable alternative.
·
That the Princes would see
that their best hope for a future would lie in rapidly joining and becoming a
united block without which no group could hope, mathematically, to wield power.
However, the princes did not join, and thus exercising the veto provided by the
Act, prevented the Federation from coming into existence. Among the reasons for
the Princes staying out were:
o
They did not have the
foresight to realize that this was their only chance for a future;
Congress
had begun, and would continue, agitating for democratic reforms within the
Princely States. Since the one common concern of the 600 or so Princes was
their desire to continue to rule their states without interference, this was
indeed a mortal threat. It was on the cards that this would lead eventually to
more democratic state regimes and the election of states’ representatives
in the Federal Legislature. In all likelihood these representatives would be
largely Congressmen. Had the Federation been established, the election of
states’ representatives in the Federal Legislature would amount to a
Congress coup from the inside. Thus, contrary to their official position that
the British would look favorably on the democratization of the Princely States,
their plan required that the States remain autocratic. This reflects a deep
contradiction on British views of India and its future. Cell (p 210) wrote –
At a banquet in the
princely state of Benares Hailey observed that although the new federal
constitution would protect their position in the central government, the
internal evolution of the states themselves remained uncertain. Most people
seemed to expect them to develop representative institutions. Whether those
alien grafts from Westminster would succeed in British India, however, itself
remained in doubt. Autocracy was "a principle which is firmly seated in
the Indian States," he pointed out; "round it burn the sacred fires
of an age-long tradition," and it should be given a fair chance first.
Autocratic rule, "informed by wisdom, exercised in moderation, and
vitalized by a spirit of service to the interests of the subject, may well
prove that it can make an appeal in India as strong as that of representative
and responsible institutions." This spirited defense brings to mind
Nehru's classic paradox of how the representatives of the advanced, dynamic
West allied themselves with the most reactionary forces of the backward,
stagnant East.
Under the Act,
”There are a number
of restrictions on the freedom of discussion in the federal legislature. For
example the act forbids ... any discussion of, or the asking of questions
about, a matter connected with an Indian State, other than a matter with
respect to which the federal legislature has power to make laws for that state,
unless the Governor-General in his discretion is satisfied that the matter
affects federal interests or affects a British subject, and has given his
consent to the matter being discussed or the question being asked.” (Smith)
o
They were not a cohesive
group and probably realized that they would never act as one.
o
Each state seemed consumed
by the desire to gain the best deal for itself were it to join the Federation
– the most money, the most autonomy.
That
enough was being offered at the Centre to win the support of moderate
nationalist Hindu and Muslim support. In fact, so little was offered that all
significant groups in British India rejected and denounced the proposed
Federation. A major contributing factor was the continuing distrust of British
intentions for which there was considerable basis in fact. In
this vital area the Act failed Irwin’s test[5] -
"I don't believe that...it is impossible
to present the problem in such a form as would make the shop window look
respectable from an Indian point of view, which is really what they care about,
while keeping your hand pretty firmly on the things that matter."
·
That the wider electorate
would turn against the Congress. In fact, the 1937 elections showed
overwhelming support for Congress among the Hindu electorate.
·
That by giving Indian
politicians a great deal of power at the provincial level, while denying them,
responsibility at the Centre, it was hoped that Congress, the only national
party, would disintegrate into a series of provincial fiefdoms. In fact, the
congress High Command was able to control the provincial ministries and to
force their resignation in 1939. The Act showed the strength and cohesion of
Congress and probably strengthened it. This does not imply that Congress was
not made up of, and found its support in, various sometimes competing interests
and groups. Rather, it recognizes the ability of Congress, unlike the British
Raj, to maintain the cooperation and support of most of these groups even if,
e.g. in the forced resignation of Congress provincial ministries in 1939 and
the rejection of the Cripps Offer in 1942, this required a negative policy
harmful, in the long-run, to the prospects for an independent India which would
be both united and democratic.
No significant group in India accepted the
Federal portion of the Act. A typical response was[6] -
”After all, there are five aspects of
every Government worth the name: (a) The right of external and internal defence
and all measures for that purpose; (b) The right to control our external
relations; (c) The right to control our currency and exchange; (d) The right to
control our fiscal policy; (e) the day-to-day administration of the
land…. (Under the Act) You shall have nothing to do with external affairs.
You shall have nothing to do with defence. You shall have nothing to do, or,
for all practical purposes in future, you shall have nothing to do with your
currency and exchange, for indeed the Reserve Bank Bill just passed has a
further reservation in the Constitution that no legislation may be undertaken
with a view to substantially alter the provisions of that Act except with the
consent of the Governor-General…. there is no real power conferred in the
Centre.” (SPEECH BY MR BHULABHAI DESAI ON THE REPORT OF THE JOINT
PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE ON INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, 4 FEBRUARY 1935.
However, the Liberals, and even elements in the
Congress were tepidly willing to give it a go[7] -
“Linlithgow asked Sapru whether he thought there was a
satisfactory alternative to the scheme of the 1935 Act. Sapru replied that they
should stand fast on the Act and the federal plan embodied in it. It was not
ideal but at this stage it was the only thing …. A few days after Sapru's
visit Birla came to see the Viceroy. He thought that Congress was moving
towards acceptance of Federation. Gandhi was not over-worried, said Birla, by
the reservation of defence and external affairs to the centre, but was
concentrating on the method of choosing the States' representatives. Birla
wanted the Viceroy to help Gandhi by persuading a number of Princes to move
towards democratic election of representatives. … Birla then said that
the only chance for Federation lay in agreement between Government and Congress
and the best hope of this lay in discussion between the Viceroy and
Gandhi.”
The British government sent out Lord Linlithgow as the new viceroy with the remit
of bringing the Act into effect. This was an unfortuante choice dictated by
British politics rather than by any assessment of Indian needs. On the plus
side, Linlithgow was intelligent, extremely hard working, honest, serious and
determined to make a success out of the Act. On the negative side, he was
unimaginative, stolid, legalistic and found it very difficult to "get on
terms" with people outside his immediate circle. This legalistic approach,
unfortunately, reinforced the extremely legalsitic Act of which he was one of
the main authors.
When under pressure, which was most of the time,
Linlithgow retreated into the details of administration while going immobile on
the strategic level. This contrasts with Gandhi's tendency to retreat into a
unrealistic idealistic, semi-mystical pronouncements adn Nehru's tendency under
pressure to retreat into dogmatic socialism. if you throw in Jinnah's stubborn,
legalistic pursuit of Muslim maximum goals the combination did not make for the
finding of practical compromise solutions to massive problems.
In 1937, after a great deal of confrontation,
Provincial Autonomy was launched. From that point until the declaration of war
in 1939, Linlithgow tirelessly tried to get enough of the Princes to accede to
launch the Federation. In this he received only the weakest backing from the
home government and in the end the Princes rejected the Federation en masse. In
September 1939, Linlithgow simply declared that India was at war with Germany.
A more imaginative and flexible viceroy, such as Irwin, might have tried to
consult with Indian leaders and obtain a resolution fo support from the Central
Legislative Assembly. Though Linlithgow's behaviour was constitutionally
correct it was also offensive to much of Indian opinion. This led directly to
the resignation of the congress provincial ministries which drove another nail
into the coffin of Indian Unity.
From 1939, Linlithgow concentrated on supporting
the war effort.
Two quotes:
For Brown
the 1930s are the "critical decade," where change for once ovrrwhelmed
continuity (pp. 242-43).
Here too, however, as before, political negotiations, and the ensuing constitutional
reforms, take center stage. Individual congressmen, she insists, had but a "fleeting
commitment" to civil disobedience. Instead, drawn by the "magnetism" of the
new political institutions, and anxious at the same time to extricate themselves from
"fruitless conflict," they embedded "Western-style" democratic politics at the heart of India's political life (pp. 277-78). This "transplantation" of Western forms,
embodied above all in the 1935 Government of India Act—a "resounding
success"—thus becomes the sheet anchor of India's later stability and testifies, by implication, to
the triumph of the Raj in preparing the way for its own demise…. Brown … focusses on the
critical importance of the "weakening of the network of collaboration"
(p. 314)…. Both agree that
India emerged into independent existence as a "broadly" democratic
and capitalist society and that it has remained ever since committed to this
"path of development."
For Brown this outcome was, and is, a product of processes of accommodation and adaptation in an
inherently stable society, where "traditional beliefs" remain powerful, and
the government has but "a limited capacity to engineer change" (pp. 377-78).[8]
The 1935 Government of India Act proved
to be a landmark in the development of India. For all its 'ifs' and 'buts', its
complications and hesitations, it marked a point of no-return in constitutional
development, which the Montford reforms did not. They had left the ultimate
goal hazy and with their periodic inquiry, the next step uncertain. Dominion
status was now the accepted goal, federalism the accepted framework, and
parliamentary institutions the accepted form of government. Provision was made
for changing the constitution from within. In many ways the Act was a blueprint
for independence, a fact to which the retention of its general shape and the
lifting of whole seed of the text into the Constitution of 1950 testifies.
In Britain the Act represented a new
consensus on India in a way the 1919 Act can hardly be said to have done. Then
there was general agreement that an experiment should be made in the direction
of self-government, but no agreement as to its ultimate outcome or future
policy to be followed. In the sixteen intervening years there was, in fact, a
revolution in British opinion about India. The successful working of the
Montford reforms in several provinces, in spite of setbacks in others and the
rapid development of the country, had had their effect. But, above all, the
strength and discipline of the Civil disobedience movement of 1930-31, and the
skill of its direction, together with the new attitude of the princes, had
convinced the mass of Conservative opinion that the national movement was not
only a reality, but a paramount reality. Terms must be made with it, and, that
being the case, a Conservative government should seek to guide the movement
along its own lines rather than put up futile barriers to be swept away one by
one by an ever rising nationalist flood. The Act thus represented not only a
consensus of British political opinion but also a considered attempt to provide
a conservative form for ultimate Indian independence. Britain would go into
partnership with an independent India, but she would see to it, if she could,
that the new India was one in which the conservative interests predominated.
The Act is thus not only significant as a British political compromise, or as a
step towards meeting Congress demands, but also as a deliberate plan for the
conservative political evolution of India. These conservative political
features are to be seen specially in the federal structure, in the treatment of
the princes, and in various constitutional devices. If pursued to its logical
conclusion this policy would have seen an India independent indeed in ten to
twenty years' time, but so weighted on the side of existing vested interests
that its shape would have been quite different from that which we know today.[9]