Essay by
David.Steinberg@houseofdavid.ca
Home page http://www.houseofdavid.ca/
Note - I originally posted
this essay on Wikipedia but decided to copy it to my own web site unmodified,
4. The Concept
of an All India Federation
5. The Genesis of the Round Table Conferences
6. Were They Really Round Table Conferences – Were
they Honest Negotiations?
7. Agenda – Dominion Constitution?
8. Why the Congress Did Not Attend
10. Second Round Table Conference (Sept.-Dec. 1931)
- A Conservative Federation Scheme
11. Third Round Table Conference (Nov.-Dec. 1932)
12. Related Wikipedia Articles
The two most important official statements of
British policy concerning India were Queen Victoria’s Royal Proclamation, of
1858, when the crown took control of the East India Company’s Indian
territories, and the statement of Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu (July 17, 1917 - March 19, 1922)
to the House of Commons on 20 August 1917.
Queen
Victoria’s Proclamation included the promise that –
“… so far as may be, Our
Subjects, of whatever Race or Creed, be freely and impartially admitted to
Offices in Our Service, the Duties of which they may be qualified, by their
education, ability, and integrity, duly to discharge.”
The British Government of India studiously
subverted this promise denying Indians commissions in the Indian Army and
almost completely excluding them from the Indian Civil Service and the higher
ranks of the Indian Police.
Edwin Montagu’s statement included the following
–
“The policy of His Majesty’s government, with which
the Government
of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of
Indians in every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of
self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an
integral Part of the British Empire…. I would add that progress in this
policy can only be achieved by successive stages. The British Government , and
the Government of India, on whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and
advancement of the Indian people, must be the judges of the time and measure of
each advance, and they must be guided by the co-operation received from those
upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred and by the extent
to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of
responsibility.”
The promise of “responsible government” together with the subsequent Indian
representation on international bodies clearly implied a commitment to move
India to dominion status (see Mehrota pp. 238-241
and Keith p. 268, 467, 468)
as was explicitly confirmed by the viceroy, Lord Irwin (1926–1931) on 31
October 1929 (see India, Gwyer &
Appadorai pp. 224-225)-
The goal of British
policy was stated in the declaration of August 1917 to be that of providing for
the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the
progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part
of the British Empire…. I am authorized on behalf of His Majesty's Government
to state clearly that in their judgement it is implicit in the declaration of
1917 that the natural issue of India's constitutional progress, as there
contemplated, is the attainment of Dominion Status.
British policy, until almost the end of the British Raj,
was that the timing and nature of Indian constitutional development was to be
decided exclusively by the British Parliament though, it was
assumed that Indians would be consulted as appropriate. This was formally stated in the Government of India Act 1919 and
reiterated in Lord Irwin’s
announcement of the appointment of the Simon Commission. The
British only conceded the right of Indians' to frame their own constitution in
the 1942 Cripps
Declaration. Indian unhappiness with this paternal approach was described
by Mehrota (pp. 219-221)
-
“All political parties in India in the 'twenties
recognized the legislative supremacy of the Imperial Parliament. Even the Congress, which took its stand on the
principle of self-determination, bowed to the sovereign and ultimate authority
of Parliament. What it challenged was the assertion contained in the Preamble
to the Act of 1919 that 'the time and manner of
each advance can be determined only by Parliament'. 'Now, that is a
proposition', said Motilal Nehru, 'which we cannot accept…. , Liberals,
Independents and Muslim Leaguers-all alike claimed that Indians should
have an equal voice in framing the future constitution for their country,
however much they might have differed from Congressmen in the manner of
asserting that claim. Dominion precedents were frequently quoted by
Indian nationalists in support of their demand to frame their own constitution
and submit the same to Parliament for ratification. The recent example of
Ireland and the remarks made by Imperial statesmen justifying the procedure
followed in her case only strengthened the claim of Indian nationalists. The latter noted and
remembered what Lloyd George had remarked during the debate on the Anglo-Irish Treaty on December 14, 1921: 'Here
we are going to follow the example which has been set in the framing of every
constitution throughout the Empire. The constitution is drafted and decided by
the Dominion, the Imperial Parliament taking such steps as may be necessary to
legalize these decisions.'… Sir
John Simon …. (in a) speech he … delivered in Parliament on November 27,
1922 … (said) 'I believe it would be true to say that Constitutions which promote
prosperity and loyalty, and which have been found to be lasting Constitutions
for subordinate States in our Empire, have, almost without exception, either
actually or virtually, been formed by those who were to live under them
themselves.’”
Compare this to Winston
Churchill’s December 11, 1930 speech to the Indian Empire Society (James p. 4934-4938) –
“From
many quarters we hear statements that opinion in India has advanced with
violent speed. Full Dominion status with the right to secede from the British
Empire and responsible control of the executive Government are cIamoured
for by even the moderates represented at the Round Table Conference. The
extremists who are, and will remain, the dominant force among the Indian
political classes have in their turn moved their goal forward to absolute
independence, and picture to themselves an early date when they will obtain
complete control of the whole of Hindustan, when the British will be no more to
them than any other European nation, when white people will be in India only
upon sufference, when debts and obligations of all kinds will be repudiated and
when an army of white janissaries, officered if necessary from Germany, will be
hired to secure the armed ascendancy of the Hindu.
“All
these absurd and dangerous pretensions have so far been met in speech with
nothing but soft deprecatory and placatory words by the British Government in
India, or at home. Vague high-sounding phrases about 'full Dominion
status'; 'India a great world power' have filled the air. British-owned
newspapers in India-of which there are still some-have been forced to the
conclusion that Parliament will agree to anything that Indians can agree upon
among themselves, provided that India remains nominally at least a part of the
King's dominions. The effect of the speeches delivered during the five days'
open session of the Conference has certainly been to give the impression that a
vast extension of self-government is immediately contemplated and that
all that remains is to settle the detail and method of the transference of
powers, and to make some provision for the protection of minorities.
“It has therefore become necessary, in order that
this landslide of opinion should not lead to undue disappointment, that the
basic facts should be restated in unmistakable terms. The British nation has we
believe no intention whatever of relinquishing effectual control of Indian life
and progress. The Round Table Conference now sitting has no power to frame a
constitution for India. No agreement reached at the Conference will be binding
in any degree, morally or legally, upon Parliament. No agreement of the
Conference is necessary to authorise the framing of a new Government of India
Act. The responsibility for framing such an Act will rest entirely with the British
Government….
Even in the present House of Commons with its Socialist minority Government,
there is a substantial majority against the extension, in any period which it
is profitable to consider, of anything like Dominion status. It seems certain
that a new House of Commons will have come into existence before a Government of India Act can be introduced,
and it is highly probable that that new House of Commons will be far more
representative of the strong, patriotic elements of our country than the
present. Therefore the persistent attempts to avoid stating unpalatable truths,
and to shirk facing the stern facts of the situation, can only excite false
hopes which may afterwards lead to strife and suffering.
“So
much for the facts in England! What are the facts in India? We are told that
the opinion of India has changed. But the facts of India have not changed. They
are immemorial. The political classes of India are a mere handful compared to
the population. The Western ideas they have gathered and reproduced have no
relation whatever to the life and thought of India. The vast majority can
neither read nor write. There are at least seventy different races and even
more numerous religions and sects in India, many of them in a state of
antagonism….
“If
the British Government and its servant and projection, the Government of India,
had maintained a true contact with realities, three-quarters of the distress
caused to the politically-minded classes in India could have been avoided. If,
instead of raising alluring hopes of speedy Dominion status, we had concentrated
upon practical steps to advance the material condition of the Indian masses; if
the Congress at Lahore which burnt the Union Jack had been broken up forthwith
and its leaders deported; if Gandhi had been arrested and tried as soon as he broke the
law; if the will to rule had been firmly asserted, there would have been no
necessity for the immense series of penal measures which have, in fact, been
taken…. the plain assertion of the resolve of Parliament to govern and to guide
the destinies of the Indian people in faithful loyalty to Indian interests
would in a few years-it might even be in a few months-bring this period of
tantalised turmoil to an end.
“Where,
then, do we stand? The word of the King-Emperor is inviolable. We are pledged
not only to labour for the welfare of India, but perseveringly to associate
Indians of every race and creed with the processes of their own development.
The Act of 1919 is a rock which cannot be removed. By that Act we conferred
great and new constitutional powers upon the Indian political classes and we
pledged ourselves to extend those constitutional powers honourably and
perseveringly. We have assigned no theoretical limit to the extension of Indian
constitutional development within the Empire. But by that same Act we reserved
to ourselves an equal right to restrict, delay, or, if need be, for a spell to
reverse that process. So far as there exists any contract between a people
conquered by force in former times, and the modern Parliament of a benevolent
nation vowed to promote their welfare, that is the contract, and there is no
other.
“Let
us examine the problem upon this basis and in the light of practical events. The far-reaching extensions of self-government with which Mr. Montagu's
name is associated were a bold experiment. They have not succeeded. The ten years which have
passed have been years of failure. Every service which has been handed over to
Indian administration has deteriorated; in particular, Indian agriculture, the
sole prop of the life of hundreds of millions, has certainly not advanced in
accordance with the ever-growing science and organisation of the modern world.
The Indian political classes have not accepted the Montagu constitution. Even
those for whose especial benefit and pleasure that constitution was devised
have derived no satisfaction from it. Either they have refused to co-operate,
or they have used the liberties which it conferred not for the purpose of
improving the well-being of India, but merely as convenient tools and processes
for political agitation and even sedition. There has resulted unrest,
improverishment and discontent, drawing with them repressive measures and
curtailments of civil liberties, which did not exist before the political
liberties were widened.
“In
these circumstances, a new Parliament will have to decide what is now to be
done. Our right and our power to restrict Indian
constitutional liberties are unchallengeable. Our obligation to persevere in associating the
peoples of India with their own government is undoubted. We are free to call a
halt. We are free, for the time being, to retrace our steps, to retire in order
to advance again. So long as the continuous purpose is sincerely and
unswervingly pursued, Parliament has entire discretion. It is evident that our
first efforts to create an all-India constitution have been ill-conceived. It
may well be that our duty and our course now lie in curtailing the functions of
an all-India body and in building up in each province more real, more intimate,
more representative organisms of self-government. It may well be that these
organisms, when developed and established, will form a surer foundation for an
all-India Government than the present crude and unduly Westernised conception.
“But
here I must draw attention to a very grave danger. The Indian gentlemen and
notabilities who are attending the Round Table Conference are in no way
representative of the real forces which challenge British rule in India. It is
true that, drifting with the tide, many of them have become the mouthpiece of
extreme demands, but they have no power to pledge the Indian Congress Party to
sincere acceptance of any agreement that may be outlined. The danger is that in
an unwise endeavour to reach an agreement here in London, the Socialist
Government will commit itself to concessions and extensions of self-government
which will weaken our hands in the future, without in any way procuring the
assent of the ruthless forces of sedition and outrage. Our concessions will, therefore, only be used as the starting-point for
new demands by revolutionaries, while the loyal elements and the masses of the
people will be the more unsettled by further evidences of British weakness. The
truth is that Gandhi-ism and all it stands for will, sooner or later, have to
be grappled with and finally crushed. It is no use trying to satisfy a tiger by
feeding him with cat's-meat. The sooner this is realised, the less trouble and misfortune will there
be for all concerned. Above all, it must be made plain that the British nation
has no intention of relinquishing its mission in India, or of failing in its
duty to the Indian masses, or of parting with its supreme control in any of the
essentials of peace, order and good government. We have no intention of casting
away that most truly bright and precious jewel in the crown of the King, which
more than all our other Dominions and Dependencies constitutes the glory and
strength of the British Empire. The loss of India
would mark and consummate the downfall of the British Empire. That great
organism would pass at a stroke out of life into history. From such a
catastrophe there could be no recovery. But we have yet to learn that the race
and nation which have achieved so many prodigies and have faithfully discharged
so many difficult tasks, and come safely and invincibly through all the perils
of the centuries, will now fall a victim to their own lack of self-confidence
and moral strength.”
Descriptions of what happened vary greatly
(listed from the most to least probable)
a. Malaviya
Proposed Round Table, The Viceroy Lord Reading Agrees, Mahatma
Gandhi Sabotages the Idea Proudest p 194-5
(fully referenced)
"The
Prince of Wales was due in Calcutta on 24 December, and any more violent
disorder there had to be prevented at all costs..... During the next two months
over 30,000 people were arrested in India as a whole, and of the top leadership
of the non-co-operation movement, only Gandhi remained free…. There was a very
real danger for the government that its new wave of repression would drive the
Liberals and Moderates back into the Congress camp, which would have been disastrous.
Malaviya had been urging the viceroy for some time to call a round-table
conference with Gandhi and the Moderates. In mid-December, Reading agreed,
promising at the same time to release the political prisoners, end the
repressive measures, and even grant 'full provincial autonomy' if Gandhi would
call off the non-co-operation movement…. At first, Gandhi agreed. But he
quickly changed his mind, wiring Malaviya: ‘Non-co-operation can cease only
after satisfactory result conference. In no case have I authority to decide for
Congress.’ His ‘private notes’ made at the time give a more complex, perhaps
more revealing, reason for his decision: ‘I am sorry,' he wrote, 'that I
suspect Lord Reading of complicity in the plot to unman India for eternity.’
"There
is little doubt that if Gandhi had agreed to attend the conference, the
Moderates would have joined forces with him to achieve substantial
constitutional concessions. Reading was prepared to give full responsible
government to the provinces, despite the doubts of London and most of the
senior governors. He told Montagu: ‘I ... was prepared to act on my own
responsibility if the proper assurances had been forthcoming.’ This would have
been not merely a step but a giant leap towards self-government, advancing the
eventual transfer of power by a full 15 years. But it was not to be…. at a
stormy annual session of Congress in Ahmedabad, Gandhi came under attack both
from those who wanted to seek an accommodation with the government and those
who wanted more militant action immediately. But in the end, as always, Gandhi
carried the day, His rejection of Reading's offer was confirmed, and he was
given dictatorial powers over non-co-operation. He announced that the postponed
campaign of 'offensive civil disobedience' in Bardoli would go ahead.
"Although
they had been upset by Gandhi's intransigence, some of the Moderates were still
hoping to find some way of bringing Gandhi and Reading together, to achieve the
positive constitutional advances they knew were possible. Jinnah and Malaviya
called an all-parties conference in Bombay …. Gandhi attended 'informally',
after Congress had agreed to postpone the start of civil disobedience until the
end of the month. The motions calling for a round-table conference were passed
unanimously, But then Gandhi threw another spanner in the, refusing to take
part. Obsessed with putting full-scale satyagraha to the test, he decided that
a conference 'for devising a scheme of full swaraj [is]
premature. India has not yet incontestably proved her strength'."
b. Reading Proposed Round Table – Cabinet Vetoes Bridge p. 11 (Based
on D. A. Low, “The Government of India and the first Non-cooperation Movement,
1920-22”, Journal of Asian Studies, XXV (1966), pp. 241-59)
"Lord
Reading, the Liberal Viceroy (1921-6), had reached the end of
his tether…. faced with massive demonstrations looming against the Prince of
Wales in Calcutta, he wavered add asked for permission to convene a round
table, conference and offer concessions-possibly full provincial autonomy. An
emergency meeting of the Cabinet India Committee refused him outright and told
him to arrest Gandhi, who was still at large, forthwith. Still smarting over
the Irish Treaty of the previous week, they were not prepared to retreat again
at the bidding of a nervous Viceroy whose character some of them doubted.
Gandhi was arrested in March 1922 and jailed for six years (though he was out
in two). Civil disobedience collapsed."
c. Reading Opposes the Proposed Round Table Reading 1945 p. 195
"The
situation was in fact critical. The influence of the Government had so gravely
declined that in various quarters both in India and in England it was suggested
that the only course was for the Viceroy to call a Round Table Conference in an
attempt to reach an agreed settlement of India's political problems. But Lord
Reading set his face against all such hints and proposals, and not only
declared his intention of refusing to take the initiative in summoning such a
conference but also of rejecting the proposal if made by anybody else. For he
realized that there could be no compromise with the out-and-out extremists, who
at this time were in full control of the non-co-operation movement; as he
himself wrote: 'The truth is, the more I consider the question of a Round Table
Conference, the more I lean to the conclusion that unless the
non-co-operationists make very material changes in their programme, it will not
be possible to conciliate them.'"
The Montagu-Chelmsford Report (1918) foresaw
the eventual need for an All-India federation (“Granted the announcement of
August 20th, we cannot at the present time envisage its complete fulfilment in
any form other than that of a congeries of self-governing Indian provinces
associated for certain purposes under a responsible government of India; with
possibly what are now the Native States of India finally embodied in the same
whole, in some relation which we will not now attempt to define.") The Simon Commission clearly
foresaw the necessity for an All-India federation but saw it as a far off goal.
It was not within the Commission’s mandate to investigate this issue. The
Report states (vol. 2 p. 13)
“That
some of the leading Indian Princes envisage some such polity in the future is
shown by the pronouncement made on 19th December, 1929, by H.H. the Maharaja of
Bikaner to the Legislative Assembly of his State. "I look forward to the
day when a United India will be enjoying Dominion Status under the aegis of the
King-Emperor and the Princes and States will be in the fullest enjoyment of
what is their due-as a solid federal body in a position of absolute equality
with the federal provinces of British India." However distant that day may
be, we desire in our proposals to do nothing to hinder but everything to help
its arrival, for already there are emerging problems that can only be settled
satisfactorily by co-operation between British India and the States.”
The Viceroy, Lord Irwin,
convinced the new Labour government of Ramsay
MacDonald to allow him to make the following public statement to still
Indian suspicions on 31 October 1929 (see India, Gwyer &
Appadorai pp. 225-227).
“The
Chairman of the [Indian
Statutory] Commission has pointed out in correspondence with the Prime
Minister … that as their investigation has proceeded, he and his colleagues
have been greatly impressed, in considering the direction which the future
constitutional development of India is likely to take, with the importance of
bearing in mind the relations which may, at some future time, develop between
British India and the Indian States…. He suggests that what might be required,
after the Reports of the Statutory Commission and the Indian Central Committee
have been made, considered and published, but before the stage is reached of
the Joint Parliamentary Committee, would be the setting up of a Conference in
which His Majesty's Government should meet representatives both of British
India and of the States, for the purpose of seeking the greatest possible
measure of agreement for the final proposals which it would later be the duty
of His Majesty's Government to submit to Parliament. … With these views I
understand that His Majesty's Government are in complete accord….
“The goal of British policy was stated in the
declaration of August 1917 to be that of providing for the gradual development
of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of
responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire…. I
am authorized on behalf of His Majesty's Government to state clearly that in
their judgement it is implicit in the declaration of 1917 that the natural
issue of India's constitutional progress, as there contemplated, is the
attainment of Dominion Status.
“In
the full realization of this policy, it is evidently important that the Indian
States should be afforded an opportunity of finding their place, and even if we
cannot at present exactly foresee on what lines this development may be shaped,
it is from every point of view desirable that whatever can be done should be
done to ensure that action taken now is not inconsistent with the attainment of
the ultimate purpose which those, whether in British India or the States, who
look forward to some unity of all-India, have in view.
“His
Majesty's Government consider that both these objects, namely, that of finding
the best approach to the British Indian side of the problem, and secondly, of
ensuring that in this process the wider question of closer relations in the
future between the two parts of Greater India is not overlooked, can best be
achieved by the adoption of a procedure such as the Commission has outlined.
When, therefore, the Commission and the Indian Central Committee have submitted
their Reports … His Majesty's Government … will propose to invite
representatives of different parties and interests in British India and
representatives of the Indian States to meet them, separately or together, as
circumstances may demand, for the purpose of conference and discussion in
regard both to the British-Indian and the all-Indian problems. It will be their
earnest hope that by this means it may subsequently prove possible on these
grave issues to submit proposals to Parliament which may command a wide measure
of general assent.”
This statement was backed by Stanley
Baldwin the leader of the Conservative Party but opposed by many
Conservatives as well as by prominent Liberal Party leaders Lloyd
George and Lord
Reading and by Sir John Simon. The statement did have appositive
impact in India at least until opposition pressure forced the government to
declare that Irwin’s announcement did not imply any change in established
British policy toward India (Bridge 1986 pp. 37-37).
According to Bridge (p. 34) –
“There
is little doubt that Lloyd George's interest in the declaration was purely
strategic, but Reading's was not. His objection was that the declaration rested
on two dangerous ambiguities. First, it could be read as constituting a
departure from the 1919 policy of reform by stages. Second; it was not clear
that Parliament, not the conference between the British government and Indian
politicians, was the final arbitrator…. Perhaps there was a personal element
too. As Viceroy, Reading had been denied a round table conference in 1921. Why
should Irwin be allowed a declaration in 1929?”
The Oxford dictionary defines “round table” as
“An assembly where parties meet on equal terms for discussion.” The Indian
Round Table Conferences did not fit within this definition since the British
Government issued the invitations, set the agenda and chaired the conferences.
However, they were a big step forward from the extremely patronizing approach
exemplified by the Simon
Commission. In the event, the first conference was by far the closest to
the ideal of a round table conference while the third, was really just a short
and limited consultation exercise.
By inviting representatives of minor elements in
Indian life e.g. Indian Christians, Eurasians, British commercial interests
etc. the British diminished the role of the few elements that really did count
i.e. Congress, Muslims, and the Sikhs in the Punjab.
The White Paper and the subsequent Government of India Act 1935 did not reflect
an honest attempt to accommodate Indian opinion as reflected in the round table
conferences –
“Among
the divergent reasons for the condemnation of the (white paper) proposals there
was, in the first place, a general agreement in regard to the failure of His
Majesty's Government to respect the principle of negotiation. Every section of Indian opinion held the view that the Government had
ignored the implications of the statement made by the Prime Minister on
December 2, 1931,in,which he said that "the Government must carry on these
negotiations until a point was reached when the proposed agreement was
initialled-a very well-known stage in the negotiation of treaties." But
the White Paper proposals did not bear even the semblance of an " initialled"
agreement.” (Gangulee p. 165)
If the British leadership really stood behind
their pledge of eventual dominion status for India they would have asked the
Indian delegates to frame their own dominion constitution and then met with
them to broker compromises on issues on which they could not agree, negotiate
temporary safeguards, perhaps with a treaty (as was done with Eire, Iraq and
Egypt) to cover British responsibilities
and interests. This would have enabled the British leadership to keep
overall control for another generation while allowing more constructive cooperation
with Indian politicians. A few quotes will illustrate this –
According to Bridge (p. 25))
Halifax thought -
“The
solution had to be daring or it would fail. He was proposing dyarchy at the
Centre. This, he hoped, would, be enough to satisfy some Swarajists but also to
keep control over essentials. He elaborated further in a letter to Lord
Stonehaven, a fellow Conservative who was Governor-General of Australia:
“I don't believe, with the right admixture of
courage and prudence, this problem ought to be insoluble. Whatever you do is
clearly a risk. . . I should seek to define very clearly -to myself what were
the limits of risk you were entitled to run and what were the safeguards you
must retain. And I don't believe that, on these principles, it is impossible to
present the problem in such a form as would make the shop window look
respectable from an Indian point of view, , which is really what they care
about, while keeping your hand pretty firmly on the things that matter and on
the gears that you may have to work if the engine races.
“Irwin,
in accordance with his commonsense Conservative philosophy, had found a
solution above logic, based on personal judgement and tacit trust more than
upon constitutional devices. The Indians would get the appearance and some of
the substance of central responsibility, while Britain would keep ultimate
control over the essentials of the army, States, foreign affairs, police and
finance should things get out of hand.”
It is possible that this would have been
acceptable, as a transition stage, with moderate nationalists. According to
Gopal (pp. 50-51)–
“The
Government were now committed to consultation with Indian leaders and a precise
ultimate objective. This statement, Irwin's first real initiative in India's
constitutional problem, lost him friends in England…. In India, on the other
true that the Viceroy had given no pledge that Dominion Status would be
established soon, or even that it would be discussed at the conference; but few
had expected it. Indeed it was believed that only joint discussions with the
Princes, as envisaged in the statement, could form the prelude to even the
first step towards Dominion Status. In the Congress, while Jawaharlal Nehru was inclined to suspect this ‘ingeniously worded
announcement, which could mean much or very little', Gandhi and his senior
lieutenants were not prepared to reject it out of hand. The real test was
whether the British meant what the Viceroy said.
‘I can wait for the Dominion Status constitution,
if I can get the Dominion Status in action, if today there is a real change of
heart, a real desire on the part of the British people to see India a free and
self-respecting nation and on the part of the officials in India a true spirit
of service.’
“So
the Congress,. In association with the Liberals, issued a manifesto offering to
co-operate in drafting a Dominion constitution if certain acts were done and
certain points clarified….
‘We
understand, however, [added the signatories], that the conference is to meet
not to discuss when Dominion Status is to be established, but to frame a scheme
of Dominion Constitution for India. We hope that we are not mistaken in thus
interpreting the import and the implications of this weighty pronouncement of
the Viceroy.’”
In a speech at the Federal Structure meeting Nov
25, 1931 Gandhi said –
“Yet,
while I say that the safeguards are unsatisfactory as they have been presented,
I have not hesitated to say, and I do not hesitate to repeat, that the Congress is pledged to giving safeguards, endorsing safeguards which may
be demonstrated to be in the interests of India.
“At
one of the sittings of the Federal Structure Committee, I had no hesitation in
amplifying the admission and saying that these safeguards must be also of
benefit to Great Britain. I do not want safeguards which are merely beneficial
to India and prejudicial to the real interests of Great Britain. The fancied
interests of India will have to be sacrificed. The fancied interests of Great
Britain will have to be sacrificed. The illegitimate interests of India will
have to be sacrificed.”
If Labour were in power with a strong majority
and Britain were not in extreme financial crisis, it is possible that Halifax
and the Labour government might have followed this path. However, the labour minority government was weak,
unstable, transient and overwhelmingly focused on domestic issues. Labour
prime minister Ramsay MacDonald was anxious to maintain India as
a “non-party” issue which meant appeasing the Conservative and Liberal parties.
The Conservative Party in turn wanted to appease its right wing diehard element.
The leader of the diehards, Winston Churchill in a speech in Parliament on
August 20, 1930 (James
p. 4913-4914), stated –
“The
original plan, on which all three British parties had agreed, was to send out
the Simon Commission, to consider their Report in Parliament, to refer it to a
Joint Committee of both Houses before whom Indian deputations could express
their views, and then to pass a Bill carrying into law the Report as modified
by Parliament, and to give orders to our officials and officers in India to put
it strictly and firmly into effect. That was the adopted plan, and that was the
constitutional procedure. But all this has now been swept aside in favour of a
Round Table Conference, a sort of large lively circus in which 80 or 90
Indians, representing hundreds of races and religions, and 20 or 30 British
politicians divided by an approaching General Election are to scrimmage about
together on the chance of their coming to some agreement.
“I
wish to place on record my conviction that it is almost certain that the result
of the Conference will be confusion worse confounded. I hope, indeed, it will
not be disastrous. It is very wrong to encourage false hopes in the minds of
the Indian political classes. They are only a handful compared to the vast
Indian masses for whom we are responsible, but they are entitled to be treated
with good faith and sincerity. It would be wrong to lure and coax them over
here with vague phrases about Dominion status, when it is quite certain that
these Indian politicians will not obtain Dominion status in their lifetime. We
may not be able to win their agreement; let us make sure we do not lose their
respect. In dealing with Indian problems and with earnest men it is far wiser
and far safer to be blunt and plain. The Round Table Conference has no power to
confer any Constitution upon India. Parliament alone can deal with that. No
proposal for Dominion status would pass through, even the present House of Commons.
We do not know what the next House of Commons will be like, but it seems
certain that is will be less favourable to Dominion status for India than the
present Parliament. Therefore I take this opportunity of stating these facts
and truths simply and straightforwardly so as to prevent, so far as a private
individual can prevent, the very grave dangers and reproaches of disappointed
hopes.
“Let
me, however, also reaffirm the inflexible resolve of Great Britain to aid the
Indian people to fit themselves increasingly for the duties of self-government.
Upon that course we have been embarked for many years, and we assign no limits
to its ultimate fruition. But I thought the great merit of the Simon Report was
in showing that our steps should be turned in a different direction from that
followed in the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. The experiment of magnifying the
power of an All-India Assembly has failed. It has produced weakness and
inefficiency in government, confusion in the minds of the masses, and has in no
way satisfied even those political classes for whose benefit it was devised. It
is in the building up of truly representative institutions in the great
provinces of India, institutions which shall have their roots deep in the soil
and in the life of the Indian masses, that the path of practical progress now
lies. Until these local organisms have been effectively developed and are seen
to be working well and giving good government and justice to the Indian people,
it would be unwise in any way to increase the responsibilities of the Central
Assembly-that artificial abstraction of Indian nationalism which only ignorance
and folly could identify with India.”
It was clear that whatever its aim, the round
table conference would not be framing an Indian constitution let alone a
dominion constitution.
|
“As the Viceroy's House
meeting wore on Jinnah and Sapru reasoned
with Gandhi and Nehru, urging them to realize that the avowal of
Dominion Status and the offer of a Conference
were tangible advances in British policy. Gandhi then said that he did not want his people to go to the Conference in their weakness.
While India was disunited as she was at present, and while there were these vast differences of opinion among his
friends, there was no use in going
to London. . . . For this lack of unity he blamed British rule and said that he had learned the lesson of
divide and rule from the British.
. . . Could the Round Table Conference bring about unity in England? . . . The only difficulty he saw
was the lack of unity. If there were complete unity, His Majesty's
Government could not refuse to admit the
grant of Dominion Status. “It is
quite clear that Gandhi was not referring to the left and right wings of the Congress but to the
Hindu–Muslim conflict. When Motilal wrote to Gandhi in complaint against the
viceroy's secretary's transcript of the discussion, he was explicit about the
thrust of Gandhi's remarks: that 'owing to
[the] weakness in [the] communal position the British Cabinet's
assurance of support was necessary'. There was 'no use going to London while
communal differences persisted', unless the Indian leaders knew that the
viceroy and the Cabinet would support their claims. To go to a Conference divided and without assured
British backing for Dominion Status would be to invite Britain to play off the
communities against each other and to deny constitutional advance in view of
their disunity…. “Moonje
wrote direct to Gandhi to urge him not to agree to any modification of the
Nehru Report in order to placate the Muslims, and a group of Bombay Hindus
proffered similar advice.' Jayakar counseled him that no concession could possibly be made except at the stage when
a Dominion consitution was being framed. Earlier concessions would be plucked from their context and become the basis for further demands. Clearly, Gandhi
could foresee that he would have no
room for manoeuvre on the communal question unless the government were prepared to back his demand for
Dominion Status. It is scarcely surprising that Gandhi refused to
attend a Conference in London without
being assured of either Indian unity or government support for Indian
freedom. … Both Sapru and Jinnah believed that Indians must as a first priority
solve the communal problem. If India could not achieve her
own unity then she could scarcely expect to achieve dominionhood.” Moore 1974
pp. 100-104
|
All the Indian actors attended the first round
table conference except Congress which was the only organized national party
and the only organization that could justly claim to speak for a mass or
supporters. It really was Hamlet without the prince of Denmark. Congress might
well have attended a round table tasked with drafting a dominion constitution.
However, even this would probably have split Congress as radicals, such as
Nehru had rejected dominion status as a goal in favour of complete
independence. “Like the rest of the Congress leadership, Gandhi knew that
attendance at the London conference would be political suicide. Congressmen
would be forced to follow an agenda set by the British and they were certain to
return home with far less than they demanded. Moreover, and this galled,
Congress would have to sit alongside other 'representatives' of India, most
notably the princes. They were forthrightly denounced by Gandhi as 'pawns'
created and used by the British.” (Lawrence James p.
524).
Three key points about this conference were:
·
a weak Labour
minority government was in power which increasingly sought support from the
Conservatives and Liberals;
·
the Congress
boycotted the conference though “moderate Congress” positions were espoused by
the Indian Liberals; and,
·
the huge
economic crisis of the Depression was putting huge stresses on the British
economic-social-political system.
The Round Table Conference was opened officially
by the King on Thursday, 13 November 1930. Someone to everyone’s surprise, the
idea of an All India federation was unanimously moved from a likely necessity
in the dim future to the centre of discussion. All the groups attending the
conference supported the concept though for different reasons.
·
The
Conservative and Liberal leaderships saw this as a way of avoiding the demand
of British India for a responsible national government. In the first place, the
inclusion of the Indian Princely States would delay any transfer of
responsibility at the Centre and secondly, providing the princely States with
weightage, and ensuring that the princes themselves picked their
representatives at the Centre could be used both to deny the Congress power,
and to ensure a conservative and pro-British cast to the eventual federation.
According to Bridge (pp. 55-57) –
Sir
Samuel Hoare lost no time in acquainting himself with the implications of
all-India federation. First, he saw Hailey, who was in London as a Government
of India adviser at the Conference. The shrewd Hailey advised him to press
MacDonald for “an undertaking that there will be no dyarchy at the Centre
except on the basis of a central federal assembly". "Having begun
with federalism", Hailey continued, "and arranged for a further
enquiry into it", it might then be possible to go on with provincial
autonomy…. the Conservatives and Liberals saw it as the "only chance of
getting away" from the road to central responsibility for British India ….
If it failed, it was still a useful delaying tactic. If the Princes actuaIly
did federate, their presence would make central responsibiIity much more palatable
from a British point of view…. On 12 December Hoare presented his thoughts to
shadow cabinet in a document headed "Conservative Policy at the Round
Table Conference"…. None of the Conservative delegation had "the
least intention of weakly surrendering our position in India", Hoare then
related how the Conference had agreed to an all-India federal legislature and
thereby taken the "remarkable step" of "eliminating the
Legislative Assembly of British India". This had "made it possible to
rescue British India from the morass into which the doctrinaire liberalism of
Montagu had plunged it"…. "It is possible to give a semblance of
responsible government and yet retain in our hands the realities and verities
of British control", to "keep for ourselves the threads that really
direct the system of government'
There could be
"a very wide interpretation of the overriding powers of the Viceroy".
The army, "the ultimate instrument of control", would be
"completely in our hands".
As to finance, we
could [so] tie it up with (1) a Statutory Currency Board for the control of
exchange, (2) a Reserve Bank for managing reserves and many kindred financial
questions, and (3) a permanent prior charge upon the Federal revenues for
interest upon loans, salaries and pensions, the payment of the army etc. that
the sphere of responsibility could be reduced to a minimum…. Like Irwin before
him, Hoare unfolded a grand design for holding the commanding heights of the
Raj while gaining important kudos for giving away inessentials.
It is clear that even Hoare, the most moderate
of the Conservative leadership did not intend to honour Britain’s commitment to
give India dominion status if this could be avoided.
At a Conservative
Party Council meeting on 30 June, he (Hoare) announced that Conservative
participation in the session would be contingent upon "a clear and
definite assurance from the Government" that "the essential
safeguards must be real and permanent, and capable of being exercised in the
interests of this country no less than in those of India” (p. 66)
·
The Labour
leadership saw the All India federation concept as one which could plausibly be
portrayed as in keeping with Britain’s liberal long-term Indian commitments
while, gaining Conservative and Liberal support and allowing Britain to
maintain control of India’s finances to Britain’s (and, in the British view,
India’s) benefit;
·
The Princely
States say the All India federation concept as a way of reducing the burden of
British paramouncy and ensuring their future autonomy within a truly
self-governing India if one should ever emerge; and,
·
Sapru, the
leading Indian Liberal, worried about the inability of Indians to negotiate a
communal agreement, saw an All India federation as a means of progress as a
path to rapidly acquiring Dominion Status with safeguards while somehow
brushing under the carpet the vital Hindu-Muslim disagreements
There was little attention paid to the obvious
contradictions –
·
without the
congress no worthwhile deal was possible;
·
without a
major and immediate share of real power at the Centre and a clear path to a
democratic, united, dominion status India with a strong central government no
deal with Congress or the Indian Liberals was possible;
·
a democratic,
united, dominion status India with a strong central government would be
unacceptable to the Muslims and Princes;
·
the essence
of the Conservative party position was to deny Indian politicians power at the
Centre for as long as possible and to prevent, if possible, the emergence of a
dominion status or independent India controlled by Indian politicians.
These contradictions would doom all attempts to
work out and acceptable Indian constitution before independence in 1947.
Four major differences from the first round
table:
·
Congress Representation - The Gandhi-Irwin
Pact opened the way for Congress participation in this conference. Gandhi
attended as the sole official congress representative. Gandhi claimed that the
Congress alone represented political India; that the Untouchables were Hindus
and should not be treated as a “minority”; and that there should be no separate
electorates or special safeguards for Muslims or other minorities. These claims
were rejected by the other Indian participants.
·
National Government - two weeks earlier the Labour government had
fallen. Ramsay MacDonald now headed a National Government
dominated by the Conservative Party.
·
Financial Crisis – During the conference, Britain went off the Gold Standard, Cabinet
tied the rupee to sterling thus using India gold to stabilize Britain’s
currency and the general election returned a large Conservative majority.
This conference proved again that the devil’s in
the details. In spite of serious efforts Ghandi was unable to reach agreement
with the Muslims on Muslim representation and safeguards.
At the end of the
conference Ramsay MacDonald undertook to produce a ‘communal award’ for
minority representation with the proviso that any free agreement between the
parties could be substituted for his award. “Mr. MacDonald announced the
'Communal Award' on August 16, 1932. According to the Award, the right of
separate electorate was not only given to the Muslims of India but also to all
the minority communities in the country. The Award also declared Untouchables
as a minority and thus the Hindu depressed classes were given a number of
special seats, to be filled from special depressed class electorates in the
area where their voters were concentrated.” (The Communal
Award 1932).
Aiyer (pp. 346-347)
justly commented -
... is any country in the world which has not had its own backward classes,
or the problems created by their existence. The problems are generally more
acute, where the backward classes are racially distinct from the other classes
in the country. The treatment of the coloured races by their fellow subjects of
European or American extraction is a far more heinous blot on the civilization
of the latter and the governments of the countries where such treatment is
tolerated. How solicitous the white races are at heart for the welfare and
uplift of coloured races can be judged from the manner in which the negroes are
treated in the southern states of America and the negroes and the Asiatic races
are treated throughout Africa and elsewhere. The world knows how, after going
to war with the Boers on the pretext inter alia of the ill-treatment of Indian
settlers in South Africa, the British Government coolly handed over the
destinies of its Indian subjects to the keeping of the white settlers and how
the Imperial Government proposes to confer responsible government on a handful
of white settlers in East Africa in disregard of the interests of the much
larger numbers of Indian settlers. No one in India can believe in this effusive
solicitude of the British Government for the depressed classes as a sincere
answer to the political demands of the country. It is believed, not without justice,
that the various reasons put forward as arguments against any large relaxation
of Imperial control are not the real reasons which weigh with the Imperial
Government. The true reason is that, though the British Government admits that
they hold the country as trustees for the people, they are not wholly
disinterested trustees. On the other hand, they are deeply interested in the
maintenance of the status quo and in their own domination of India.
Gandhi took
particular exception to the treatment of untouchables as a minority separate
from the rest of the Hindu community. To reverse this situation, he negotiated the Poona Pact with Dr.
Ambedkar the untouchable leader.
From September 1931 until March 1933, under
Hoare’s supervision the proposed reforms took the form reflected in the Government of India Act 1935.
·
Secretary of State for India