

Chapter X

THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

Indian Foreign Affairs—The Frontiers—The Indian States—The Indian Political Department—The Political A.D.C. to the Secretary of State—The Order of the Star of India—The Indian Warrant of Precedence

The Political and Secret Department of the India Office has inherited the functions of the old Secret Committee of the India House. The natural division of Indian "political" business into "external" and "internal," the latter meaning relations with the Indian States, provides it with two quite distinct spheres of work.

Foreign Affairs

France and Portugal retain possessions on the mainland of India, and our external neighbours are Persia, Afghanistan, China (both on the Kashmir and the Burma frontiers), Nepal, Tibet, France (in Indo-China), and Siam. Aden being an integral part of India (the internal administration is still Indian though political matters are now controlled by the Colonial Office) Turkish and Indian territory were co-terminous before the War. As the Yemen is now entirely independent India is no longer in direct contact with Turkey. In earlier days British influence in Muscat—for the waters of the

Persian Gulf have been long policed by our authorities—gave India an interest in Zanzibar, then an overseas possession of the Sultans of Muscat, while when we first went to Somaliland we made it a political suburb of Aden, though its control was subsequently made over to the Foreign Office, who in turn transferred it to the Colonial Office.

While inland Asiatic countries like Afghanistan and Tibet could hardly have come into contact with the British Empire at all but for our possession of India, and our policy towards Persia is necessarily influenced by Indian interests, the course of events must in any case have brought about diplomatic intercourse with China and Siam. Questions connected with India have in modern times played a minor part in our relations with France, but Anglo-Russian relations have been profoundly influenced by the steady if unavoidable expansion towards each other of the Asiatic territories of the two Powers. While the British Foreign Office very rightly can never forget that the King rules over a considerable proportion of the Moslems of the world, the Government of India has direct responsibility for seventy millions of them. Thus the India Office and the Foreign Office necessarily keep in very close touch with regard to Russia, Turkey and Persia, but the peculiar importance of Turkey, until Mustafa Kemal abolished the Ottoman Caliphate as well as the Sultanate, lay in the fact that the vast majority of Indian Muhammadans regarded the Sultan as the Caliph of the Islamic world. The Afghan War of 1879 was undertaken to prevent the establishment of Russian predominance at

Kabul, and the conquest of Burma in 1885 was forced upon us by King Theebaw's determination to play off against each other his British and his French neighbours. It is interesting to find Sir Alfred Lyall* writing to Lord Curzon nearly thirty years ago:—

"The foreign relations of India are regulated by a kind of unwritten Monroe Doctrine. I mean that we maintain over all the countries immediately adjacent the policy of allowing no intervention by other European nations, and the predominance of no influence except our own. It is this necessary attitude that gives us incessant occupation abroad in Asia, and brings us into continual contact or collision with European rivals."

Yet England has never waged war against any European Power on account of India; even the local contests with the French in the eighteenth century were episodes in the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War, though it is probable that the rivalry of the two nations in India could not have been settled peaceably even had there existed no *casus belli* in other parts of the world. But the picture of an India surrounded by spheres of British interest into which no other European influence can safely be allowed to penetrate is now completely out of date. A weak

* Sir Mortimer Durand: "Life of Sir Alfred Lyall," p. 398. Chapter xviii of Sir Alfred Lyall's "Rise and Expansion of British Dominion in India" (5th edition, 1910) contains the best survey of Indian Foreign Policy, but it was written before the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, and the complete independence in external relations obtained by Afghanistan in 1919 has further altered the conditions.

"Buffer" State may be a positive source of danger, for the policy of a State too weak to be really independent towards powerful neighbours must be capricious. It can confidently be said, therefore, that in our Asiatic foreign policy our cardinal objects are that countries like Persia and Afghanistan should be stable, strong and friendly. The same purpose has long dominated our Chinese policy. The contact of the Indian and Chinese Empires in difficult mountainous regions inhabited by wild tribes (as on the Burma-Yunnan border) may occasionally produce frontier "incidents," but British policy in China rests mainly on British commercial and economic interests. But Sir Alfred Lyall's dictum holds good of territories which form no part of any organised Asiatic state, such as the principalities of Chitral, Hunza and Nagar, and the Pathan tribal country outside the sphere of direct British administration. The independent tribal territory on the North-West Frontier presents the paradox of considerable fighting forces without any fixed system of internal government.

The Frontiers

Many books have been written about the North-West Frontier, and the most conflicting views on frontier policy have been urged by Indian administrators as the result of long personal experience. Lord Curzon, pursuing a plan suggested by Lord Lytton, separated the North-West Frontier Province from the Punjab, and brought the territories under the direct control of the Foreign Department of the Government of India, exercised through a Chief

Commissioner at Peshawar. The financial burden of India's military defence is mainly due to the conditions of the North-West Frontier. An enormous mass of detailed information comes regularly to the India Office on frontier affairs, not only from the north-west, but from the less known regions of India's north-east frontier, where far more primitive tribes, like Nagas and Abors find their immemorial customs of head-hunting and slave-raiding increasingly difficult under the stress of modern conditions. Important questions of frontier policy are of course submitted by the Government of India to the Secretary of State. Thus his Political Department is concerned with *welt-politik*,* so far as India is affected thereby, with questions of frontier administration and the regulation of our tribal policy, and more indirectly, with the relations of the Government of India to the Indian Ruling Princes. The actual control of Anglo-Afghan relations has been transferred to the Foreign Office, which, in close consultation with the India Office, issues instructions to the British Minister at Kabul and discusses current questions with the Afghan Minister in London, for the Government of India is intimately concerned with British relations towards the independent kingdom on its border.

* The Political Department of the India Office does not handle the work occasioned by India's membership of the League of Nations and co-operation in international conferences on economic or labour questions, or the problems arising from the emigration of Indians to other parts of the Empire or to foreign countries. These matters are treated in the Economic and Overseas Department, which also, in co-operation with the Foreign Office, advises on questions connected with the position in India of aliens, including Christian missionaries of foreign nationality.

While Afghanistan has now complete freedom of political intercourse with the rest of the world and receives at Kabul diplomatic representatives of the European Powers, the Government of India is for international purposes in complete control of the Indian States within the Empire.

The Indian States.

It is not always realised that about one-third of the area of India, containing over one-fifth of the total population, is ruled by Indian Princes or Chiefs, who owe allegiance to their Suzerain the King-Emperor. More than seventy million Indians are in law not British subjects. The position of the States, from the point of view of political science, is one for which no really close parallel can be found in the history of the world, nor is it possible to lay down any single formula which would accurately express the relations of all the States (over six hundred in number) to the Paramount Power. The British Crown has inherited the prerogatives of the Mogul Emperors, but the actual relations of the British with many of the existing States were formed after the decay of Mogul authority. The degree of autonomy of the rulers varies from a condition of internal independence (subject to the right of the Paramount Power to intervene in case of gross misgovernment or of domestic anarchy) to a status, in the case of minor chiefships, comparable to that of the feudal subordinates of mediæval Kings in Europe. The relations between the several States and the Government of India are defined in a vast series of individual treaties (bi-lateral

agreements) and Sanads (grants of authority or privileges by the Paramount Power). As the late Sir William Lee-Warner wrote*: "The tie which unites the Native States, various in their size and several conditions, with the British Government, is not strengthened by law or by the support of any federal courts. No supreme assembly defines or registers changes in the character of their political intercourse. Such privileges as have been declared have resulted from particular conflicts arising out of their own environment of circumstances, and they are not to be found collected together in any manual that bears the stamp of authority." The term "conflict" hardly covers the whole ground, for though it is true that the declaration of privileges, either in strict law or in executive practice, often arises out of the settlement of a dispute, there are many cases in which novel contingencies have given rise to a difficulty that has been solved by voluntary agreement.

Lee-Warner, whose book remains the most comprehensive study of the Indian States, though very important developments have taken place in the fifteen years since its last edition was published, divides their history as regards relations with the British into three periods: Non-intervention up to 1813, a policy of keeping them in "subordinate isolation" from 1814 to 1857, and since the Mutiny a progress towards closer union between British India and the States, subject to the Ruler's rights in domestic affairs. The close of the second period

* "The Native States of India," by Sir William Lee-Warner, 1910, p. 7.

was marked by the occasional adoption of two principles which alarmed the Rulers—the doctrine that in the case of States which owed their preservation to British intervention a "Gadi" left without heirs lapsed to the British Government, and the assertion of a right to annex a State in case of gross misgovernment. These two principles were definitely abandoned when the Crown took over India. The right of adoption of an heir by Hindu rulers with the sanction of the Crown, was recognised, special Sanads being issued by Lord Canning. The preservation of any Hindu ruling house can no longer be regarded as dependent on the accident of the continuance of the direct male line: on the failure of natural heirs any succession that is valid under Hindu law may be recognised. A similar guarantee was given to Muhammadan States: succession valid by Muhammadan law (which does not admit the Hindu system of adoption) is recognised. Difficult questions still arise, since the Muhammadan law of succession is founded on a principle of division of the estate amongst the kin that cannot be applied to a political entity, and the customs of Moslem dynasties have not been uniform. But the important point is that the preservation of the State is assured.

Equally important is the principle of policy which preserves a State if it has been necessary to depose the Ruler. The crimes or misdemeanours of an individual are not allowed to destroy the political rights of his house or to obliterate the separate existence of his State. Long before the departure from this principle marked by the annexation of

Oudh, Mysore, when conquered from the Muhammadan soldiers of fortune who had seized it, had been not annexed but restored to its old Hindu dynasty; and when Lord William Bentinck found it necessary to remove the Hindu Maharaja for misconduct and to take over the administration of his territories in order to secure decent government, the State was not incorporated in British India but held in trust for its native line. To their direct rule it was restored half a century later by Lord Ripon. The "rendition" of Mysore was a political event of the first importance. So far have we moved from the complacent doctrine that British rule, being better than any indigenous system, ought to be extended when events placed at our disposal the territory of an Indian ruler, that in 1910 the Maharaja of Benares, the position of whose house had long been that of great landholders in British territory, was re-established as a Ruling Prince.

The staunch support given to the British by the Rulers of Indian States in the Mutiny, even when in some cases their soldiers or subjects had joined our enemies, inaugurated a fresh era, and the direct intervention of the Crown in the Government of India introduced a new relationship between the States and the British Empire, which has been fostered by the visits to India of His present Majesty and of four other members of our Royal Family. The assumption of the Imperial title by Queen Victoria in 1877 enhanced the place of British India in the Empire and established a direct relation between the dynasty and its Indian subjects. But

it made an even greater change in the nature of the association which links the Indian States to their Sovereign. Lord Lytton's Delhi Durbar, which some English critics thought theatrical, was in truth the public inauguration of a new system of association between the Crown and the Indian Princes. Though his idea of joining some of the Princes with the high officers of the Indian Government as "Counsellors of the Empire" had little practical effect, the partnership has steadily developed. The system of Imperial Service Troops established in Lord Dufferin's Viceroyalty, under which the leading States voluntarily maintain forces that have shown their efficiency by the side of the Indian Army in three Continents, affords a striking contrast, in their order, discipline and character, to the motley armed forces which Ruling Chiefs formerly maintained as a relic of the old era of internecine wars, and, in the conceptions underlying their existence, to the "Contingents" which the British had required certain States to finance but could not allow them to control. Lord Curzon and Lord Minto are known to have considered plans for a Council of Princes; Lord Hardinge personally consulted some of the leading Rulers, with excellent result, on problems common to the States and to British India. In August, 1914, the spontaneous unanimity with which the Princes placed all the resources of their States at the service of the Empire revealed to the outer world that His Majesty had among Hindus, Muhammadans and Sikhs staunch allies as well as faithful subjects, and that beyond the limits of British India there existed

a series of States which regarded their welfare and their very existence as closely bound up with the success of British arms.

The separate political life of each State is concentrated in its internal administration: the States can enter into no relations with Foreign Powers: they maintain no representatives at each other's Courts, and except with the consent of the Governor-General conclude no mutual engagements. While their people are not, in law, British subjects, His Majesty's Government protects them equally with British Indian subjects in foreign countries, and passports are granted to them as "subjects of a State in India in subordinate alliance with His Majesty."

The boundaries between the States and British India are often marked by no natural features, and in very few instances do they coincide with any racial division. There are more Sikhs in the British Punjab than in the Sikh States; and many times more Mahrattas in the Bombay Presidency than under the rule of Mahratta Princes. The racial and religious diversities of India as a whole exist throughout most of the States, and perhaps the most important fact in this connection, though a fact not always appreciated, is that, except on the outskirts of India, there is as a rule no difference of race, descent, creed, or custom, between the people of a British district and the people of an adjoining State. Modern developments have necessarily led to common arrangements for such purposes as railways and Customs, to mutual extradition of offenders, and to police co-operation for the suppres-

sion of dacoities. When the connection began the Governor-General in Council was the autocratic ruler of British India, and the Government of India was in composition entirely British. But the grant of representative institutions to British India altered the position, since, though the Legislature is precluded from discussing or interfering in the affairs of the States, the Rulers and people of the States cannot remain totally unaffected by the political development of British India.

Under any constitution close connection and common action between British India and the States would still be necessary for many purposes, and the position of the Ruling Princes in the India of the future is one of the most important of the problems confronting statesmen. Tentative steps towards associating the Princes with the administration of British India were occasionally taken in the past, but it has gradually been recognised that the bond of union is to be found in the Viceroy's exercise of the functions delegated to him by the Imperial Crown and not in the ordinary legislative or administrative machinery. Soon after the Mutiny the Maharaja of Patiala sat as a nominated Member of the Indian Legislative Council, and forty-five years later Lord Minto's Government discussed with the Secretary of State the possibility of forming an Advisory Council of Notables for all India, to include Princes as well as leading representatives of British India. Such a plan could hardly have succeeded, apart from difficulties which would inevitably have arisen from the susceptibilities of many of the Rulers. The arrangement actually

adopted for providing the Princes with a means of deliberating together and advising the Supreme Government took an entirely different shape. Lord Chelmsford had convened informally an annual conference of Rulers of the States, and the "Montagu-Chelmsford Report"* which precluded the Government of India Act, discussed the possibility of further developments. The informal Princes' Conference of 1919 passed a resolution in favour of a permanent Council, and in 1921 the "Chamber of Princes" or "Narendra Mandal" was established by Royal Proclamation and opened in the Diwan-i-Am of the Moghul Palace at Delhi by H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught. This is a body which all Ruling Princes who possess a dynastic salute of eleven guns or more and enjoy the style "His Highness" are entitled to attend, as also "Rulers who exercise such full or practically full internal powers as in the opinion of the Viceroy qualify them for admission," while in the case of Ruling Chiefs of lesser States a system of representation has been established. The Viceroy presides over the meetings of the Chamber, which elects its own Chancellor and four other members of the Standing Committee, subject to the condition that the Princes of Rajputana, Central India, Bombay and the Punjab, must each be represented. The functions and limitations of the Chamber can best be understood from a passage in the Royal Proclamation:—

"My Viceroy will take its counsel freely in matters

* Cmd. 9109, 1918. Chapter x.

relating to the territories of the Indian States generally, and in matters which affect those territories jointly with British India or with the rest of My Empire. It will have no concern with the affairs of individual States or their Rulers, or with the relations of individual States to My Government, while the existing system of the States and their freedom of action will be in no way prejudiced or impaired."

The Chamber has met annually since 1921, but the Rulers of some important Indian States have as yet taken no part in its proceedings.

Several Ruling Princes went with their troops to France, and the new relationship of their Order to the Empire has been marked by the presence of Indian Princes, as already mentioned, at the Imperial War Conferences of 1917 and 1918, at the Premiers' Conference of 1921 and the Imperial Conference of 1923, and by their participation in the representation of India in the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva.

The Indian Political Department

The Viceroy himself is in charge of the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India, and as representative of the King-Emperor is responsible for the conduct of political business with the States. In each State (or group of lesser States) is a British Political officer, while in some instances several such officers are subordinate to an Agent of the Governor-General. More direct relations between certain States and the Government of India have recently been formed by the centralisation

of political business formerly transacted by the Governments of Madras, Bombay and the Punjab with adjoining States. All developments of note are regularly reported to the Secretary of State, but it is only as regards important questions of policy that the work of the India Office is concerned with the States. The salutes of guns accorded to the several Rulers are decided by the King-Emperor, and any proposal for alteration is submitted to His Majesty by the Secretary of State. The Political Department of the India Office does not conduct the recruitment of officers for the Political Department of the Government of India, which is mainly filled by selected officers of the Indian Civil Service or the Indian Army, but the Secretary of State in Council of course exercises the same control, in matters such as pay and pension, over this as over the other All-India departments or services. The duties of the Indian Political officers comprise three quite distinct functions: they are employed as Residents or Political Agents in the Indian States, as administrative officers in the North-West Frontier Province and certain other frontier tracts, and as Consular officers beyond the borders of India. Thus our Consuls in Persia, though all under the direction of H. M. Minister at Teheran, are appointed partly from the British Consular Service and partly from the Indian Political Department, which also provides Political officers for the Persian Gulf. Although the Foreign Office and not the Government of India now conducts relations with Afghanistan, the officer appointed as His Majesty's Minister at Kabul has up to the present been

selected from the Indian Service, as is His Majesty's Envoy to the Court of Nepal. In several cases a senior officer combines quasi-diplomatic functions in an Indian State with the direct administrative supervision of British territory. The duties of the Indian Political officer no longer involve the possibility of exile to Somaliland, but they may summon him to places as far apart as Muscat and Kashgar, and move him from the stately ceremonial of a Rajput Court to the strenuous and comfortless life of a constantly "sniped" camp in Waziristan.

The Political A.D.C.

From members of this Service is usually chosen the Political A.D.C. to the Secretary of State, who has many duties in connection with the visits to England of Princes, and may be described as a *liaison* officer for ceremonial purposes between Buckingham Palace and the India Office. His duties are multifarious and sometimes delicate. They included on one occasion, as we learn from the "Reminiscences" of the late Sir Owen Burne, the surreptitious arrangement of a boxing display by prize-fighters in the stables of Buckingham Palace for the edification of the Shah Nasr-ed-Din of Persia, a function which, though it did not come to the knowledge of Queen Victoria, was interrupted by the inopportune arrival of a deputation of Bishops. But history gives no support to the enterprising novelist who made a Political A.D.C. spend most of a winter night treading water in the channel of the Thames and listening to such snatches of a deep conspiracy as reached his frozen ears through

the open porthole of a mysterious yacht's cabin.

The Star of India

The institution of distinct Indian Orders of Knighthood* is closely connected with the more direct assumption of Government by the Crown. It seems probable that Queen Victoria herself originated the idea which took shape in the Order of the Star of India. As regards titles already established in India, Lord Canning deprecated any change, except a greater care in the preservation of a formal and authoritative record in order that the Crown of England "should be understood to assume to itself the authority and to invest itself with the trust heretofore claimed by the Emperors of Hindustan over all their subjects and vassals, whether Muhammadan or Hindu." But there was a general desire to bestow a new and special mark of distinction on Ruling Princes who had manfully taken sides with the British in the Mutiny. The original conception was that of a high Order of one class, comparable to the Garter, of which Her Majesty should be the Sovereign. The Viceroy strongly recommended that the new Order should not be confined to Indian Princes: the association in it of a few Englishmen of high distinction was, he urged, in itself desirable as a bond of union, and would give the decoration a higher value in the eyes of Indian Princes than it was likely to possess if it had a distinct racial basis. As so often happens in

* Detailed information on the Indian Orders of Knighthood and other Indian decorations will be found in Appendix II.

official affairs, the fundamental points were settled with little trouble, but the minor details provided material for nearly two years' discussion. It was not actually instituted until 1861, and the delay was due to difficulties about the name, which at times seemed almost insuperable. The Prince Consort wrote constantly on the subject to the Secretary of State (Sir Charles Wood), and Lord Canning occasionally discharged a long-distance shell, while the Members of Council at the India Office exhausted their Oriental scholarship and their knowledge of the view that Indians hold on such subjects. The first suggestions produced by Sir Frederick Currie and Sir John Lawrence, after consultation with Indian friends, were either "The Star of Honour for England and India" or "The Eastern Star of Honour." But the word "Honour" was discarded, not for Lady Teazle's reason, but because it was too reminiscent of the famous French decoration. The authorities, however, hitched their wagon to a Star, as Emerson would have said, though they little foresaw over what rocky ground the Star would lead them. The Sun had been ruled out because of the Persian Order of the Lion and the Sun, while various animals and flowers were considered only to be dropped. The remarkable variety of nomenclature, to be found in European Orders of Chivalry, which ranges from "Le Saint Esprit" to "The Thistle," was discussed in letters between the Prince Consort and Sir Charles Wood. It is not impossible that India was saved from an Order of the White Elephant only because Denmark in her eighteenth-century dreams of an Oriental

dominion had pre-empted that style. (Siam seems to have been ignored.) The Prince Consort suggested "The Eastern Star" as appropriate in spite of possible objections from astronomers, and the Eastern Star irradiated the proceedings until it was shattered by Lord Canning's artillery. It appeared that "Poorbeah" was the only possible rendering of "Eastern," and, apart from the recent association of that word with mutinous sepoys of the Bengal Army, Lord Canning was assured by Sir Bartle Frere that people in Western India did not think so highly of their Eastern neighbours as to make the proposed name suitable. Lord Canning preferred "Western Star"; the new light shone from England, and Indians, like Chinese, do not regard their country as being at the East end of the world. But the style "Western Star" was held to suggest the decadence of a heavenly body. Designs had been approved for the anonymous star, when the permanent Civil Service took a hand in the game. Mr. Herman Merivale, the Under-Secretary of State, found that a five-pointed star had been sanctioned, and was compelled by his knowledge of heraldry to point out that a five-pointed thing that looks like a star is really a mullet. But this intrusion of heraldic orthodoxy was evidently regarded as intolerable: the Star of India still has five points. The somewhat battered emblem was re-emerging as "The Star of England and India" when the patriotism of the Lord Chancellor, Lord Campbell, blazed up against the slight to "natives of Scotland" who had played so honourable a part in Indian affairs. The "Star of Britain and India" seems

never to have arisen in the firmament, though "the Star of Empire" twinkled for a moment, for the Prince Consort wrote resignedly to Sir Charles Wood that it was necessary to start afresh. He suggested "The Star" or "The Celestial Star," and clung to the hope that there must be some inoffensive Hindustani word that meant "celestial." The objection was raised that all stars were celestial.

The Secretary of State, perhaps a little tired by this time, boldly proposed "The British Star": the Prince Consort saw no strong objection to that except that there is no such star in Heaven, but touched a new note by proposing the "Star of Peace"; the experts, however, declared that the only Hindustani equivalents of the word "Peace" meant merely agreement after war, or rest, or sleep. In due course Lord Canning gave the final blow to the new idea by pointing out the incongruity of the term for a decoration to be bestowed on distinguished soldiers. And so at last the matter came before the Cabinet, who seem quickly to have decided on "Star of India": a simple and acceptable title that appears never to have occurred to anyone at an earlier stage.

The motto of the new Order has recently been discovered to be due to the Prince Consort. At an early stage H.R.H. sent Sir Charles Wood a list of possible mottoes, all in Latin, one of which was "Lux Coeli Dux Noster." This sentiment found favour, but Lord Canning protested against going down to history as the Viceroy who had compelled Maharajas to learn Latin, and "Heaven's Light Our Guide" at last shone over the new emblem.

Details connected with the institution of decorations may be trivial in themselves, but it is sometimes exceedingly troublesome to get small things right. A recent Secretary of State for India, comparing the functions of the India Office with those of an elephant, observed that, whatever might be thought of its success in piling teak, there was no doubt that it could pick up pins. But the minor activity often requires expert guidance from outside.

The Warrant of Precedence

The relative rank of decorations, however, is an easy problem compared with that of the relative precedence of individuals. A glance at the Warrant of Precedence in India, printed in the annual India Office List, shows that it rests upon a purely official classification: it starts with the Viceroy and somewhat unexpectedly ends with sub-deputy opium agents. It is an entertaining document in its completed form, but must have been very maddening to compile. The casual reader may wonder why a Director of Zoological Survey should rank three classes below an Archdeacon of Bombay, but three classes above an Archdeacon of Lahore. The reason is to be found not in any theory of the respective claims of religion and science, but in the official history of the multitudinous appointments, civil, military and ecclesiastical, which the Government of India must recognise. In so far as a man has an official position, it must be possible to grade him. But to fix the mutual position of office-holders in diverse services does at times seem like an attempt to weigh the incommensurable, and it must

have been difficult to assess the rival claims of an Assay Master and of a Private Secretary to a Governor. If a man belongs to a class of official to which a certain place is assigned, but holds a particular post graded higher or lower "he will be entitled to the highest position accorded to him," a generous gesture in marked contrast to the provision which runs like a *leit-motiv* through Indian financial regulations, that if an official appears to be entitled to two different sums of money—such as half average salary or a thousand rupees—he shall always get "whichever is less."*

Unfortunately, so far as the present purpose is concerned, we are a long way from the eighteenth-century days when every British non-official visitor to India was an "interloper," and it has proved necessary to temper the purely official rigour of the Warrant by a somewhat elastic recognition of persons who have precedence of their own at Court, but hold no Indian appointment.

Since any alteration in the Warrant must be submitted to the King, its provisions are at times the subject of correspondence between the Government of India and the India Office. A certain discretion is left to the Governor-General by the terms of the Warrant. This is the more necessary because it has been absolutely impossible to assign any fixed precedence for the Ruling Princes and Chiefs of the Indian States, some of whom are

* An official, suffering from a decision of his superiors, once delighted the Bengal Club by suggesting that rulings of the Government were to be "interpreted by law, equity, or good conscience, whichever is least!"

frequent visitors at the Viceregal Court, and most of whom meet on the occasion of great Durbars. The histories of the States are so diverse, the claims to priority in some cases so conflicting, and the actual existence of a common meeting-ground is of such recent date, that the only practicable course has been to confine the scope of the Warrant to British subjects, with provision by courtesy for the consular representatives in India of Foreign Powers. The correspondence of 1859 shows that such a gathering of Indian Princes and Chiefs as actually took place only eighteen years later, when Lord Lytton announced at Delhi Her Majesty's new style of Kaiser-i-Hind, lay far beyond the horizon. For more than a century and a half the Rulers of Indian States had never had an opportunity of peaceful meeting.

Chapter XI

THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT

The King's and the Company's Troops—The East India Volunteers—The Indian Army—The India Office Military Department—Lord Clive's Fund—The Marine Services

The King's and the Company's Troops

Royal Forces appeared in India as early as 1661, when Charles II sent soldiers to take possession of Bombay, but when he made over his new acquisition to the East India Company (already firmly established at Surat), these King's troops were in 1668 encouraged to transfer to the Company's service, and developed into the 1st European Regiment Bombay Fusiliers. One hundred and ninety years later the pendulum swung back, and the Company's European Regiments were incorporated in the British Army. No more King's troops came to India until 1754, when the 39th Foot (now 1st Battalion Dorset Regiment) were brought by Admiral Watson to reinforce Clive, a fact recognised by their motto "Primus in Indis."

In the meantime the Company had been forming its own local forces*, and obtaining from the Crown

* An excellent sketch of the development of the Indian Army from the earliest days is contained in a Government of India publication, "The Army in India and its Evolution," Calcutta, 1924.