Dutch Proposals for Indonesian Settlement Feb 10 1946

See also

- Text and Comments on the Radio address by Queen Wilhelmina on 7 December 1942

- Dutch Proposals for Indonesian Settlement 6 November 1945

- Text and critique of the Linggadjati Agreement

- Text and Comments on the Renville Political Principles

- Parallel and Divergent Aspects of British Rule in the Raj, French Rule in Indochina, Dutch Rule in the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia), and American Rule in the Philippines



In their policy regarding Indonesia the Netherlands Govern­ment are inspired by the conviction expressed in the address deliv­ered by Her Majesty the Queen on December 6, 1942, by the following words:

"I know that no political unity nor national cohesion can continue to exist which is not supported by the voluntary accept­ance and the faith of the great majority of the citizenry."

The Netherlands Government consequently take the view that the peoples of Indonesia should, after a given preparatory period, be enabled freely to decide their political destiny. Therefore, the Netherlands Government, deeply conscious of their responsibil­ity, consider it their duty to do everything in their power in order to create and to fulfill as soon as possible the conditions which will permit such a free decision to be taken and which will assure its international recognition, thereby complying with Article 73 of the United Nations Charter.

Without derogating in any way from the above-mentioned princi­ple, the Netherlands Government are furthermore convinced that the true interests of the country and of the respective peoples of Indonesia will thereafter find their best guarantee in the volun­tary continuation, in the words of Her Majesty, of:

"A realm in which the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam and Curaçao will participate with complete self-reliance and freedom of conduct for each part regarding its internal affairs, but with the readiness to render mutual assistance."

The Netherlands Government, therefore, intend, in consultation with authoritative representatives of Indonesia elected from a large variety of groups, to draft a structure for the Kingdom and for Indonesia based upon democratic partnership. This structure will remain in force for a given period of time, during which it is believed that the conditions which will make possible the taking of the above-mentioned free decision will be fulfilled; after that period the partners shall independently decide upon the continuance of their relations on the basis of a then complete and voluntary partnership. Difference of opinion regarding the question whether that period should be further extended before a free decision can be taken shall be submitted to a procedure of conciliation or, if necessary, arbitration.

With respect to the structure mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, discussions will be held in accordance with the follow­ing main points:

(A)        There shall be a Commonwealth of Indonesia, a partner in the Kingdom, composed of territories possessing different degrees of autonomy.

(B)        There shall be established an Indonesian citizenship for all born in Indonesia; Netherlands and Indonesian citizens shall be entitled to exercise all civic rights in all parts of the Kingdom.

(C)        The domestic affairs of the Commonwealth of Indonesia shall be managed independently by the Commonwealth's own institutions; for the Commonwealth as a whole the creation of a democratic representative body containing, therefore, a substantial Indo­nesian majority, is contemplated, and furthermore a Cabinet formed in political harmony with the representative body, and a representative of the Crown as the head of the Government's executive.

(D)        To be enabled to fulfill the obligations incumbent upon the Kingdom as a result of Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations, the representative of the Crown shall possess under his responsibility to the Government of the Kingdom, special powers to guarantee fundamental rights, an efficient adminis­tration and sound financial management. These powers shall be exercised only when these rights and interests are affected.

(E)        The envisaged Constitution containing the above-mentioned structure shall comprise guarantees for fundamental rights such as freedom of worship, legal equality without discrimin­ation as to creed or race, protection of person and property, independence of the judiciary, protection of the rights of minorities, freedom of education and freedom of opinion and expression.

(F)        The central institutions functioning for the entire Kingdom shall be composed of representatives of the constituent parts of the Kingdom. The establishment of a Commonwealth Cabinet composed of Ministers from the constituent parts of the King­dom is contemplated, as also Commonwealth legislation requir­ing the agreement of the Parliaments of the respective constituent parts of the Kingdom.

(G)        After the entry into force of the above-mentioned Constitution the Netherlands Government shall promote the early admission of the Commonwealth of Indonesia as a member of the United Nations Organization.

Quoted from Djajadiningrat, Idrus Nasir, The beginnings of the Indonesian-Dutch negotiations and the Hoge Veluwe talks (Cornell University. Modern Indonesia Project. Monograph series),  Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University (1958), ASIN: B0007EG4B8 pp. 108-109



B. Background

See - http://www.houseofdavid.ca/queen.htm ; http://www.houseofdavid.ca/Indo_nov6.htm


Quoted from Yong Mun Cheong, H. J. van Mook and Indonesian Independence, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1982, pp. 66-68; 71-75

At the Singapore conference of 6 December 1945, it was agreed that Van Mook should return to the Netherlands for consultations regarding the future policy to be adopted in Indonesia. This he did and the first meeting with the Netherlands cabinet was held on 21 December. A set of proposals was drawn up by Van Mook for its consideration. He dealt with one main issue: should Indonesia be subject to the Netherlands or given the right to choose to decide its own destiny after a period of time?

He himself felt that subject to the continuance of a link, Indonesia should be granted the right to develop towards a stage of full partnership with the Netherlands when it would have the right to decide matters for itself. Using this as a point of departure, he stressed that it would be necessary to determine a period of time when the goal of complete partnership would have been reached. Meanwhile the Netherlands would remain responsible for the foreign relations of Indonesia (including its economic links with the outside world), although the latter would be given increasing influence over the direction of those relations. The Netherlands would also support the claims of the owners of economic enterprises confiscated by the Japanese. These provisions would have satisfied Netherlands interests. For the Indonesians, Van Mook argued they should have representation in the United Nations. An Indonesian army should also be established. Most importantly (with far-reaching future implications), Indonesia should be politically organised as a federation of states to guarantee the autonomy of the various constituent parts and people of Indonesia.

Van Mook's draft proposals of 21 December were a significant milestone in the history of Dutch colonial policy. This was the first time that the federal state concept was brought up officially for discussion in the Netherlands. In later years (1947-48), the federal state was associated with the notion of preventing Javanese domination of the various non-Javanese ethnic groups. However when the idea was first mooted in late 1945, that was not the rationale for its acceptance. This did not mean that the ethnic factor was totally absent. Indeed, there is evidence to show that Van Mook was not totally oblivious of the need to prevent Javanese domination. On 25 November, he had noted that a federal state in Indonesia would prevent the domination of one part over another. He also stated that the unity of Java and the Outer Islands was very fragile and that a Republican Government would not be able to guarantee the rights of the religious and racial minorities.   Van Mook argued the case for the recognition of the Republic (in Java and Minangkabau) and Dutch concentration in Borneo and the Great East. Such proposals if accepted would have made necessary the establishment of a federal state with Republican controlled and Dutch controlled areas united in a single entity. The federal state rationalised Van Mook's proposal to recognise the Republic and concentration on those areas reinforced the need for a federal state. Therefore when the federal state proposal was first made on 25 November, it was recommended because the Dutch were powerless and not because it was a panacea for the ethnic diversity of Indonesia.

It should also be noted that in Van Mook's proposals to the cabinet on 21 December, there was no mention of the internal political structure.  This was in contrast to the earlier proposals of 6 November. He later explained (in January 1946) that technical details and clauses would not give the impression of its being a wide-ranging piece of political document.

Some of the proposals met with stiff opposition from some members of the cabinet. There were two main areas of criticism. Both P. Lieftinck (Minister of Finance) and J. M. de Booy (Minister of the Navy and Shipping) insisted that the proposals should have the unity of the empire as their point of departure. But this was not reflected in the proposals. Instead, Van Mook advocated that the Indonesians should have their own army and should be represented in the United Nations. His reply to this charge was that the existence of the empire was self-evident. Moreover, the Indonesians were expecting concrete proposals from the Dutch: membership in the United Nations was crucial since neighbouring countries had already won representation; an army was important to Indonesians who had always thought that the Dutch had neglected their defense in 1941-42.

The other area of opposition lay in the delineation of the time period. Both Logemann and J. H. van Royen (Minister without Portfolio) did not wholeheartedly support Van Mook's proposals to stipulate a period of time after which Indonesia could decide on its own destiny. The two ministers felt that more important were the conditions which must be fulfilled before that stage was reached. Van Mook however was insistent that a time period should be set down. This would remove the suspicions of Indonesians that the Dutch were trying to extend their influence over Indonesia for as long as possible by attaching further conditions and guarantees.

The final document represented great departure from the proposals of Van Mook. The Netherlands for the moment would still he responsible for "good government" in Indonesia. Indonesia would he organised as a federal Commonwealth in which there would still be a Dutch Governor- General. The latter could appoint and dismiss ministers of the Commonwealth in accordance with the "political realities" found in Indonesia. The ministers were bound to implement policies determined by the Volkraad. This Indonesian Commonwealth would he a partner with the Netherlands in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Kingdom would have a cabinet made up of eight Dutch and five Commonwealth ministers. Foreign affairs would be administered by the entire Kingdom. The Kingdom would support Indonesia's admission as a member of the United Nations. Toward that end, the Dutch delegation to the United Nations would consist of Netherlands and Indonesian sections. After 25 years, the structure of the Kingdom would be reviewed on the basis of a complete and voluntary partnership.  This formula met the demands that the unity of the Kingdom be preserved. The continued role of the Governor-General was ensured.

However, the 25-year period was too long. As Van Monk pointed out later, even the relatively conservative individuals who valued the continuation of the relationship within the Kingdom spoke in terms only of a 5-year transition period, and this period was not conceived of as a span of time necessary for Indonesia to grow into an independent state but only as a period needed for the restoration of order in the country and to consult with the Netherlands on the .. development of relations.

At Batavia, Van Monk consulted his advisers on the proposals. To a man, all agreed that they were unsatisfactory. In their view, there was no clear-cut recognition of the right of self-determination after a definite period of time. The detailed description of the political structure during the period of transition gave the impression that there was nothing new but the renewal of a one-sided system of guardianship. Indonesians would only be prepared to negotiate on the basis of equality and on the principles enunciated in the Atlantic and United Nations Charters.

Instead, Van Mook counter proposed seven more general points to be embo­died in an announcement. They were as follows:

1 There would be a Commonwealth of Indonesia.

2 There would be established an Indonesian citizenship for all born in Indone­sia.

3 The domestic affairs of the Commonwealth of Indonesia would be managed independently by the Commonwealth's own institutions. For the Commonwealth as a whole, a representative body with a substantial Indonesian majority would be formed. There would be a cabinet acting in harmony with the representative body. The head of the government would be the representative of the Crown.

4 The representative of the Crown would have special powers to guarantee fundamental rights, an efficient administration and sound financial manage­ment.

5 There would be guarantees for freedom of worship, education and expres­sion, legal equality, protection of person and of property, protection of minori­ties, independence of the judiciary.

6 There would be a central institution functioning for the entire Kingdom.

7 The Netherlands Government would promote the admission of Indonesia as a member of the United Nations.


These general points would be preceded by an introduction which stated that the structure described in the seven points would only last for a certain period of time after which the Indonesians would be free to decide on their future relations with the Netherlands.

Logemann accepted Van Mook's counter-proposals with the explicit condition that the details tabled at Chequers would nevertheless remain the limit to which Van Mook could accede to Indonesian demands in any negotiations with the Republic. This position represented a victory for Van Monk for the counter-proposals certainly moderated the rather stringent conditions insisted by the Dutch ministers earlier. On 10 February 1946, Van Mook's counter-proposals were made public.

The first meeting that Van Mook had with Sjahrir [was on] 12 February 1946. There were no negotiations but merely explanations of the meaning of the proposals. No progress was regis­tered even after a second meeting on 23 February. This lack of progress is only partially explained by the ungenerous nature of the proposals. There were also indications of a hardening of Van Mook's attitude with respect to the issue of the recognition of the Republic. In November 1945, he had recommended recognition but on 13 February 1946, he wrote that Sjahrir was still living in the "dream world of independence". A fortnight later he wrote to Logemann that

Under all circumstances I will refuse the recognition of the Republic since this recogni­tion would not be sound in reality.

This change in his stand was probably due to his success in persuading the British to allow the Dutch to land troops in Java. With Christison gone, Van Mook was left to deal with Sir Archibald Clark Kerr who believed that there was no chance of recognising the Republic. The British and other great powers would not allow it. Given this support from the British, the most positive in many months, Van Mook's attitude towards recognition of the Republic changed.

Yet Sjahrir had to be provided with arguments to persuade the Republic to accept the Dutch proposals. On 26 February, Van Mook decided to issue an elucidation of the 10 February proposals to clarify doubts and to strengthen Sjahrir's hand.  There is no indication that Van Mook substantially discussed this elucidation with Logemann beforehand. It certainly was more generous than the proposals tabled at Chequers which, as already mentioned, constituted the limit of concessions that Van Mook was allowed to make in negotiations with the Republic. The elucidation stopped short at recognition of the Republic but it promised that the period of transition would end "within the lifetime of the present generation".  While the proposals made at Chequers named a Governor-General to be appointed by the Crown with the power of appointing and dismissing ministers in his cabinet, the elucidation made mention only of a representative of the Crown without any reference to his power over the ministers. At Chequers, the Governor-General was named as a member of the government in Indonesia but in the elucidation, Van Mook conceived of the representative of the Crown as responsible to a Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (comprising the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam and Curacao) in which Indonesian cabinet ministers would have seats. While the proposals made at Chequers merely promised that ministers in Indonesia would be accountable for their policy to a representative body, the elucidation of Van Mook added that as many as possible of the ministers would be Indonesian citizens and so would the composition of the representative body. Both sets of proposals reiterated the need for a Commonwealth state in Indonesia.

The reactions of both the Hague and the Republic were unclear, but they were not important, for the elucidation never constituted a matter of discussion. 

Nevertheless, when Sjahrir returned to Batavia to resume negotiations, the issue of recognition of the Republic exercising authority over the former Netherlands East Indies was the primary demand in the meetings of 13, 16 and 17 March 1946.

The impasse over the recognition issue was never resolved. When the issue was referred to discussions at sub-committee level, the Dutch representatives used very legal arguments against the recognition of the Republic: recognition would give rise to international legal problems apart from the Dutch contention that the Republic did not exercise de facto authority.


C. Critique

Considered in the most generous light this offer could be considered to be .. the Dutch equivalent of British pledges of Indian independence attained by stages, and contemplated a dominion type of relationship.[1]

However -

Quoted from Raymond Kennedy, Dutch PLAN for the Indies. Far Eastern Survey, Vol. XV, No. 7 (April 10, 1946), pp. 97-102. Pp. 99-101

The third and fourth of the itemized proposals are very important, as they outline the Dutch plan for the government of Indonesia itself. The supreme organs of administration in the Indies have been the Governor-General, the Council of the Indies, the Cabinet, and the Peoples Council or Volksraad.

The central legislature has been the main locus of political power of the Indonesians, and out of it have come most of the enactments which have gradually but steadily pulled Indonesia toward increasing democracy and self-government. The statement of policy has this to say of its future: "for the Commonwealth as a whole the creation of a democratic representative body containing a substantial Indonesian majority is contemplated." The old Volksraad was democratic and representative, but only to a degree. Only thirty-eight of the sixty delegates were elected, and the remaining twenty-two were appointed by the Governor-General. The European population was greatly over-represented, for while Europeans formed far less than one percent of the total population, they held twenty-five, or over forty percent, of the seats. The Foreign Asiatics, with about two percent of the total population, were also favored in the legislature, having five, or almost ten percent of the delegates. The natives held half of the seats, but they composed over ninety-seven percent of the population.

If the proposed legislature is to be both democratic and representative, a question arises with regard to the appointive seats. Will the Governor-General continue to appoint some delegates, and if so, how many? While appointment of delegates may not necessarily violate the principle of representativeness, it seems hardly consonant with the basic meaning of democracy. On the point of Indonesian representation, we have al­ready mentioned the probability that, despite unitary citizenship, communal voting by ethnic blocs will he retained. This seems to follow logically from the state­ment that "a substantial Indonesian majority is con­templated." No indication is given as to how substan­tial a majority the Dutch have in mind.

Reform of the voting system is not even mentioned in the statement of policy. Before the war, election of delegates to the Volksraad was carried out on the basis of an electorate severely restricted by income and property qualifications, which affected the natives al­most exclusively. Moreover, the method of election was so indirect that true mass representation was far from achieved. Especially indirect was the electoral procedure for Indonesians. If a truly democratic and representative legislature is to be established in the Indies, these impediments must be removed. Another and most crucial question which is bound to arise in relation to the Indonesian Parliament concerns the veto power formerly exercised by the Governor-Gen­eral; but this had best be considered below, along with the other proposed powers of the Governor-General.


Position of Cabinet

The statement of policy calls for "a Cabinet formed in political harmony with the representative body." The prewar Indonesian Cabinet was appointed by the Governor-General, except for the Ministers of War and Navy, who were named by the Crown. The Governor-General in turn was appointed by the Crown, so that the entire central executive branch was a creature of the Netherlands Government. Contrary to the custo­mary European principle of Cabinet responsibility to the legislature, the Indonesian Cabinet was responsible solely to the Governor-General. The Indonesian Par­liament had no voice in the selection of Cabinet members and no means of forcing the resignation of an unsatisfactory Cabinet, although it might pass a vote of no confidence in a minister. The Governor-General could act on such a vote in his discretion. Under the proposed plan, the Cabinet, once installed, will still retain its parliamentary immunity, and the appoint­ment of ministers will still remain in Dutch hands; but evidently the legislature will be given a chance to pass on the suitability of Cabinet members proposed by the Governor-General. This seems to be the sense of the clause "a Cabinet formed in political harmony with the representative body."

The powers of the Governor-General were immense in pre-war Indonesia, and among them the greatest were the veto he could exercise over the acts of the Volks­raad and his right to issue executive orders having the force of law in case of emergency. He might, indeed, modify or suspend any or all of the laws of Indonesia, if he deemed that a state of emergency existed. Such emergency actions of the Governor-General were sub­ject to confirmation by the Volksraad at its next meet­ing; and, if the legislature voted adversely, the Crown then arbitrated the disagreement.

The Governor-General's veto over acts of the legislature is not mentioned in the present statement of policy, and yet it has been perhaps the single most "undemocratic" aspect of Indonesian government. It is, of course, the standard bulwark against truly democratic legislative power in every colony; even those, like Burma and Ceylon, which have advanced to a considerable degree of home rule. The way the system has operated in the Indies has been as follows: either the Governor-General or the Volksraad might initiate a bill; in case of disagreement the bill, if pertaining to finances, went to the Netherlands Parliament for approval or rejection; if not a budget bill, the issue was resolved by a royal decree. In either case the balance of power rested in Dutch hands, and it seems probable that a change in this system will be demanded.

The section of the statement of policy which defines the Governor-General's special powers should also give pause to the Indonesians. "The representative of the Crown," it is proposed, "shall possess under his respon­sibility to the Government of the Kingdom certain special powers to guarantee fundamental rights, effi­cient administration and sound financial manage­ment. Exactly what these special powers will be, how they will be exercised, and what means will be avail­able to the Indonesian legislature to control them are all unanswered questions. The matters over which the Governor-General is entitled to exercise his special powers are so broadly defined that they could cover almost anything. He can, on his own initiative, invoke his unspecified special powers to guarantee "funda­mental rights, efficient administration and sound finan­cial management." Any Indonesian statesman who accepted such a blanket bill of goods, especially with the memory of the drastic use of emergency powers in 1941 still fresh in his mind, would be a dupe indeed. The danger is palliated not at all by the proviso that "these powers shall be exercised only when these rights and interests are affected," for decision as to when the "rights and interests" are threatened rests entirely with the Governor-General himself. While it might be argued that the President of the United States and the chief executive officers of other democratic nations possess such emergency powers, these are the freely elected leaders of sovereign states; whereas the Governor-General of Indonesia, under the proposed plan, will be an officer appointed by the ruler of a European nation to wield supreme authority over an Asiatic country which is trying desperately to free itself.

By comparison with the section just discussed, the fifth proposal of the statement of policy is straightfor­ward and relatively uncontroversial. It concerns civil rights. "The envisaged Constitution [of the Common­wealth of Indonesia] . . . shall comprise guarantees for fundamental rights such as freedom of worship, legal equality without discrimination as to creed and race, protection of person and property, independence of the judiciary, protection of the rights of minorities, freedom of education and freedom of opinion and expression." Some of the guarantees in this "bill of rights" have been well established in the Indies pre­viously. Thus the Dutch have rightfully taken pride in their religious tolerance and in their careful provi­sions for the protection of the rights of minority native groups. Although the Chinese minority group has in the past undergone discrimination and even persecu­tion, the record of recent decades has shown a swift and sweeping improvement. Legal equality has been infringed in a sense by differentiations in the laws, the courts, and legal procedure; but these variations have been prescribed for the express purpose of adapting modern concepts of justice to local, mutually dissimi­lar traditions and customs. As stated above, it seems likely that the principal change contemplated is the legal reclassification of Chinese into the same category as Europeans. Protection of person and property is a fundamental right that could hardly be omitted in the "bill of rights" of any modern constitution. This pro­vision, and the one guaranteeing independence of the judiciary, represent no innovation.


Educational Needs

Freedom of education has not been violated in Indonesia in the past, with the exception of an abortive attempt by the Government in 1932 to introduce a so-called "Wild School" ordinance. For years before this the Government had been watching with apprehension the rapid increase of "national" schools, i.e., private schools operated by Indonesian political and cultural societies; and this ordinance was designed to check the growth of the movement by forbidding persons not possessing official certificates to teach. The Taman Siswo, largest of the national-education societies, fought the ordinance bitterly and organized a resistance campaign against it, with the result that the ordinance was withdrawn.

The truth is, however, that Indonesia is in less need of freedom of education than of free education. Tuition fees have been required for all school attendance, and this ride, combined with the insufficiency of the kept native education at an astonishingly low level. Literacy never exceeded ten percent in the Indies, and, although the elementary school system began to expand rapidly during the 1930's, provisions for native education were utterly inadequate even by 1940. Very few Indonesians ever went beyond primary school, and university education was beyond the reach of all but an infinitesimal proportion of them. In short, the prewar educational system for natives was scandalously poor, especially for a country with the great natural wealth of the Indies, and for a territory ruled by a nation with such high educational standards as the Netherlands. It is a conspicuous shortcoming of the present Dutch statement of policy that it does not include an outright provision for great expansion of educational facilities and free schooling for all, at least through the primary grades. Without tremendous improvement in education, the Indonesians cannot develop many able leaders, and progress toward real native self-government and full participation on all levels cannot be realized.

The most impressive of the new guarantees is that which promises "freedom of opinion and expression." The censorship laws of the Indies have been almost unbelievable in their repressiveness, and the restrictions on free assembly and free speech have been almost as bad." Any person or group advocating independence, for example, has been liable to prosecution for sedition, and with the passage of time there was no softening of the rules. Just before the great debacle, in 1940, a government spokesman in the Volksraad declared officially that anyone who raised the issue of independence would be subject to legal punishment. Use of the word "Indonesia" was forbidden, as was singing of the "revolutionary" anthem, Indonesia Raya. Persons who violated the laws against "seditious" activities were either imprisoned or banished to remote parts of the Indies. The notorious prison camp on the Upper Digoel River in New Guinea held hundreds of political exiles at the outbreak of the war.

The sixth proposal outlines the Dutch plan for the central government of the Kingdom. "The central institutions functioning for the entire Kingdom," it is stated, "shall be composed of representatives of the constituent parts of the Kingdom." The only "central institution" specifically named, however, is a "Commonwealth-Cabinet," establishment of which, with "Ministers from the constituent parts of the Kingdom," is "contemplated." Apparently there will be a local cabinet for each of the four divisions of the Kingdom.



1.   The Republic of Indonesia shall be recognized as exercising the sovereign authority in the territory of the former Nether­lands Indies.

2.   The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia shall, if necessary, be rendered in complete harmony with fundamental principles pre­vailing in a democratic state; in so doing due consideration shall be given to the protection of minorities.

3.     In accordance with these principles the requirements for citizen­ship shall be determined on the most liberal basis possible; how­ever, those among the non-Indonesians who prefer to remain aliens shall not be prevented from doing so.

4.   On the premise to be guided by public welfare, the policy followed with respect to admittance of aliens for domicile and labor, as of investment and operation for foreign capital, shall be the open door policy.

5.   Debts of the Netherlands Indies and of the autonomous territor­ies incurred prior to March, 1942, shall for the remainder be transferred to the Republic of Indonesia.

6.   Agreements shall be concluded with the Kingdom of the Nether­lands to regulate Netherlands interests in matter of personnel, finance, economy and others in an equitable manner.

7.   For a defined period a federative union shall be constituted, composed of the Netherlands and Indonesia, whereby the conduct of foreign relations and of the defense of both countries shall be entrusted to a federal institution comprised of Dutch and Indonesian representatives.

8.   The federal institution has the additional task of assuring that in both states the fundamental (human) rights shall be respected, that an efficient administration and a sound finan­cial management are guaranteed and the agreements referred to under point 6 are adhered to.

9.   Immediately after this agreement becomes effective the Nether­lands forces shall be withdrawn from Indonesia. Wherever nec­essary, they shall be replaced by the forces of the Republic.

10.      Likewise, general amnesty shall be granted to persons convicted or prosecuted because of political and related offenses.

11.      The Netherlands Government shall promote the admission of Indo­nesia as a member of the UNO.

12.    Pending these discussions all military movements shall be suspended and the Indonesian Government shall undertake to devote special attention to the protection and evacuation of Dutch and other internees.

Quoted from Djajadiningrat, Idrus Nasir, The beginnings of the Indonesian-Dutch negotiations and the Hoge Veluwe talks (Cornell University. Modern Indonesia Project. Monograph series),  Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University (1958), ASIN: B0007EG4B8 pp. 110-111


[1] Steiner, H. Arthur, “POST-WAR GOVERNMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES”, The Journal of Politics vol. 9, no. 4 (Nov. 1947), p. 633.