Dutch Proposals for Indonesian Settlement Feb 10
1946
See also
- Text
and Comments on the Radio
address by Queen Wilhelmina on 7 December 1942
- Dutch Proposals for Indonesian
Settlement 6 November 1945
- Text
and critique of the Linggadjati Agreement
- Text
and Comments on the Renville
Political Principles
A. TEXT OF DUTCH POLICY STATEMENT - 10 February
1946
In their policy
regarding Indonesia the Netherlands Government are inspired by the
conviction expressed in the address delivered by Her Majesty the Queen on December 6, 1942, by the following words:
"I know that no political unity nor national
cohesion can continue to exist which is not
supported by the voluntary acceptance and the faith of the great
majority of the citizenry."
The
Netherlands Government consequently take the view that the
peoples of Indonesia should, after a given preparatory period, be
enabled freely to decide their political destiny. Therefore, the Netherlands
Government, deeply conscious of their responsibility,
consider it their duty to do everything in their power in order to create and
to fulfill as soon as possible the conditions which will permit such a free
decision to be taken and which will assure its
international recognition, thereby complying with Article 73 of the
United Nations Charter.
Without derogating
in any way from the above-mentioned principle, the Netherlands Government
are furthermore convinced that the true interests of
the country and of the respective peoples of Indonesia
will thereafter find their best guarantee in the voluntary
continuation, in the words of Her Majesty, of:
"A realm in which the Netherlands, Indonesia,
Surinam and Curaçao will participate with
complete self-reliance and freedom of conduct for each part regarding its internal
affairs, but with the readiness to render mutual assistance."
The Netherlands
Government, therefore, intend, in consultation with authoritative
representatives of Indonesia elected from a large variety of groups, to draft a
structure for the Kingdom and for Indonesia based upon democratic partnership.
This structure will remain in force for a given period of time, during which it
is believed that the conditions which will make possible the taking of the above-mentioned
free decision will be fulfilled; after that period the partners shall
independently decide upon the continuance of their relations on the basis of a
then complete and voluntary partnership. Difference of opinion regarding the
question whether that period should be further extended before a free decision
can be taken shall be submitted to a procedure of conciliation or, if
necessary, arbitration.
With respect to the
structure mentioned in the foregoing paragraph,
discussions will be held in accordance with the following main points:
(A)
There shall be a Commonwealth of Indonesia, a partner
in the Kingdom, composed of territories possessing
different degrees of autonomy.
(B)
There shall be established an Indonesian citizenship
for all born in Indonesia; Netherlands and
Indonesian citizens shall be entitled to exercise all civic rights in
all parts of the Kingdom.
(C)
The domestic affairs of the Commonwealth
of Indonesia shall be managed independently
by the Commonwealth's own institutions; for the Commonwealth as a whole
the creation of a democratic representative
body containing, therefore, a substantial Indonesian majority, is
contemplated, and furthermore a Cabinet formed
in political harmony with the representative body, and a representative of
the Crown as the head of the Government's executive.
(D)
To be enabled to fulfill the obligations
incumbent upon the Kingdom as a result of Article 73 of the Charter of the
United Nations, the representative of the
Crown shall possess under his responsibility to the Government of the
Kingdom, special powers to guarantee
fundamental rights, an efficient administration and sound financial
management. These powers shall be exercised only when these rights and
interests are affected.
(E)
The envisaged Constitution containing
the above-mentioned structure shall comprise
guarantees for fundamental rights such
as freedom of worship, legal equality without discrimination as to
creed or race, protection of person and property, independence of the
judiciary, protection of the rights of minorities, freedom of education and
freedom of opinion and expression.
(F)
The central institutions functioning for the entire
Kingdom shall be composed of representatives of the constituent parts of the
Kingdom. The establishment of a Commonwealth Cabinet composed of Ministers from the constituent parts of the Kingdom is
contemplated, as also Commonwealth legislation requiring the agreement
of the Parliaments of the respective constituent parts of the Kingdom.
(G)
After the entry into force of the above-mentioned Constitution the Netherlands Government shall promote the early
admission of the Commonwealth of Indonesia as a member of the United
Nations Organization.
Quoted from Djajadiningrat, Idrus Nasir, The beginnings of the Indonesian-Dutch
negotiations and the Hoge Veluwe talks (Cornell University.
Modern Indonesia Project. Monograph series),
Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of Far Eastern
Studies, Cornell University (1958), ASIN: B0007EG4B8 pp. 108-109
B.
Background
See - http://www.houseofdavid.ca/queen.htm ; http://www.houseofdavid.ca/Indo_nov6.htm
Quoted from Yong Mun Cheong, H. J. van Mook and Indonesian
Independence, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1982, pp. 66-68; 71-75
At the
Singapore conference of 6 December 1945, it was agreed that Van Mook should
return to the Netherlands for consultations regarding the future policy to be
adopted in Indonesia. This he did and the first meeting with the Netherlands
cabinet was held on 21 December. A set of proposals was drawn up by Van Mook
for its consideration. He dealt with one main issue: should Indonesia be
subject to the Netherlands or given the right to choose to decide its own
destiny after a period of time?
He himself felt
that subject to the continuance of a link, Indonesia should be granted the
right to develop towards a stage of full partnership with the Netherlands when
it would have the right to decide matters for itself. Using this as a point of
departure, he stressed that it would be necessary to determine a period of time
when the goal of complete partnership would have been reached. Meanwhile the
Netherlands would remain responsible for the foreign relations of Indonesia
(including its economic links with the outside world), although the latter
would be given increasing influence over the direction of those relations. The
Netherlands would also support the claims of the owners of economic enterprises
confiscated by the Japanese. These provisions would have satisfied Netherlands
interests. For the Indonesians, Van Mook argued they should have representation
in the United Nations. An Indonesian army should also be established. Most
importantly (with far-reaching future implications), Indonesia should be
politically organised as a federation of states to guarantee the autonomy of
the various constituent parts and people of Indonesia.
Van Mook's
draft proposals of 21 December were a significant milestone in the history of
Dutch colonial policy. This was the first time that the federal state
concept was brought up officially for discussion in the Netherlands. In
later ears (1947-48), the federal state was associated with the notion of
preventing Javanese domination of the various non-Javanese ethnic groups.
However when the idea was first mooted in late 1945, that was not the rationale
for its acceptance. This did not mean that the ethnic factor was totally
absent. Indeed, sere is evidence to show that Van Mook was not totally
oblivious of the need to prevent Javanese domination. On 25 November, he had
noted that a federal state in Indonesia would prevent the domination of one
part over another. He also stated that the unity of Java and the Outer Islands
was very fragile and that a Republican Government would not be able to
guarantee the rights of the religious and racial minorities. … Van Mook argued the case for the recognition
of the Republic (in Java and Minangkabau) and Dutch concentration in Borneo and
the Great Fast. Such proposals if accepted would have made necessary the
establishment of a federal state with Republican controlled and Dutch
controlled areas united in a single entity. The federal state rationalised Van
Mook's proposal to recognise the Republic and concentration on those areas
reinforced the need for a federal state. Therefore when the federal state proposal was first made on 25 November, it was
recommended because the Dutch were powerless and not because it was a panacea
for the ethnic diversity of Indonesia.
It should also
be noted that in Van Mook's proposals to the cabinet on 21 December, there was
no mention of the internal political structure.
This was in contrast to the earlier proposals of 6 November. He later
explained (in January 1946) that technical details and clauses would not give
the impression of its being a wide-ranging piece of political document….
Some of the
proposals met with stiff opposition from some members of the cabinet. There
were two main areas of criticism. Both P. Lieftinck (Minister of Finance)
and J. M. de Booy (Minister of the Navy and Shipping) insisted that the
proposals should have the unity of the empire as their point of departure.
But this was not reflected in the proposals. Instead, Van Mook advocated that
the Indonesians should have their own army and should be represented in the
United Nations. His reply to this charge was that the existence of the empire
was self-evident. Moreover, the Indonesians were expecting concrete proposals
from the Dutch: membership in the United Nations was crucial since neighbouring
countries had already won representation; an army was important to Indonesians
who had always thought that the Dutch had neglected their defense in 1941-42.
The other area
of opposition lay in the delineation of the time period. Both Logemann and J.
H. van Royen (Minister without Portfolio) did not wholeheartedly support Van
Mook's proposals to stipulate a period of time after which Indonesia could
decide on its own destiny. The two ministers felt that more important were the
conditions which must be fulfilled before that stage was reached. Van Mook
however was insistent that a time period should be set down. This would remove
the suspicions of Indonesians that the Dutch were trying to extend their
influence over Indonesia for as long as possible by attaching further
conditions and guarantees.
… The final document represented great
departure from the proposals of Van Mook. The Netherlands for the moment
would still he responsible for "good government" in Indonesia.
Indonesia would he organised as a federal Commonwealth in which there would
still be a Dutch Governor- General. The latter could appoint and dismiss
ministers of the Commonwealth in accordance with the "political
realities" found in Indonesia. The ministers were bound to implement
policies determined by the Volkraad. This Indonesian Commonwealth would he a
partner with the Netherlands in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Kingdom
would have a cabinet made up of eight Dutch and five Commonwealth ministers.
Foreign affairs would be administered by the entire Kingdom. The Kingdom would
support Indonesia's admission as a member of the United Nations. Toward that
end, the Dutch delegation to the United Nations would consist of Netherlands
and Indonesian sections. After 25 years,
the structure of the Kingdom would be reviewed on the basis of a complete and
voluntary partnership. This …
formula met the demands … that the unity of the Kingdom be preserved. The
continued role of the Governor-General … was ensured.
However, the 25-year period was too long. As Van Monk
pointed out later, even the relatively conservative individuals who valued the
continuation of the relationship within the Kingdom spoke in terms only of a
5-year transition period, and this period was not conceived of as a span of
time necessary for Indonesia to grow into an independent state but only as a
period needed for the restoration of order in the country and to consult with
the Netherlands on the .. development of relations….
At Batavia, Van
Monk consulted his advisers on the proposals…. To a man, all agreed that they
were unsatisfactory. In their view, there
was no clear-cut recognition of the right of self-determination after a
definite period of time. The detailed description of the political structure
during the period of transition gave the impression that there was nothing new
but the renewal of a one-sided system of guardianship. Indonesians would only
be prepared to negotiate on the basis of equality and on the principles
enunciated in the Atlantic and United Nations Charters.
Instead, Van Mook counter proposed seven more general points to be embodied in an announcement. They were
as follows:
1 There would be a Commonwealth of
Indonesia.
2 There would be
established an Indonesian citizenship for all born in Indonesia.
3 The domestic affairs of the
Commonwealth of Indonesia would be managed independently by the Commonwealth's
own institutions. For the Commonwealth as a whole, a representative body with a
substantial Indonesian majority would be formed. There would be a cabinet
acting in harmony with the representative body. The head of the government
would be the representative of the Crown.
4 The
representative of the Crown would have special powers to guarantee fundamental
rights, an efficient administration and sound financial management.
5 There would
be guarantees for freedom of worship, education and expression, legal equality, protection of person and of property, protection
of minorities, independence of the judiciary.
6 There would be a central
institution functioning for the entire Kingdom.
7 The Netherlands Government would promote the admission of Indonesia as a
member of the United Nations.
These general points would be preceded by an introduction which stated
that the structure described in the seven points would only last for a
certain period of time after which the Indonesians
would be free to decide on their future relations with
the Netherlands.
Logemann
accepted Van Mook's counter-proposals with the explicit condition that the
details tabled at Chequers would nevertheless remain the limit to which Van
Mook could accede to Indonesian demands in any negotiations with the Republic.
This position represented a victory for Van Monk for the counter-proposals
certainly moderated the rather stringent conditions insisted by the Dutch
ministers earlier…. On 10 February 1946, Van Mook's counter-proposals were made
public….
The first meeting that Van Mook had with Sjahrir … [was on] 12 February 1946….
There were no negotiations but merely explanations of the meaning
of the proposals. No progress was registered even
after a second meeting on 23 February. This lack of progress is only partially
explained by the ungenerous nature of the proposals. There were also indications of
a hardening of Van Mook's attitude with respect to the issue of the recognition
of the Republic. In November 1945, he had recommended recognition but
on 13 February 1946, he wrote that Sjahrir was still living in the "dream world of
independence". A fortnight later he wrote to Logemann that
Under all
circumstances I will refuse the recognition of the Republic since this recognition would not be sound in reality.
This change in
his stand was probably due to his success in persuading the British to allow
the Dutch to land troops in Java. With
Christison gone, Van Mook was left to deal with Sir Archibald Clark Kerr who
believed that there was no chance of
recognising the Republic. The British and other great powers would not allow it. Given this
support from the British, the most positive in many months, Van Mook's attitude towards recognition of the Republic changed.
Yet Sjahrir had
to be provided with arguments to persuade the Republic to accept the Dutch
proposals…. On 26 February, Van Mook decided to issue an elucidation of the 10
February proposals to clarify doubts and to strengthen Sjahrir's hand. There is no indication that Van Mook
substantially discussed this elucidation with Logemann beforehand. It certainly
was more generous than the proposals tabled at Chequers which, as already
mentioned, constituted the limit of concessions that Van Mook was allowed to
make in negotiations with the Republic. The elucidation stopped short at
recognition of the Republic but it promised that the period of transition would
end "within the lifetime of the present generation". While the proposals made at Chequers named a
Governor-General to be appointed by the Crown with the power of appointing and
dismissing ministers in his cabinet, the elucidation made mention only of a
representative of the Crown without any reference to his power over the
ministers. At Chequers, the Governor-General was named as a member of the
government in Indonesia but in the elucidation, Van Mook conceived of the
representative of the Crown as responsible to a Government of the Kingdom of
the Netherlands (comprising the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam and Curacao) in
which Indonesian cabinet ministers would have seats. While the proposals .made
at Chequers merely promised that ministers in Indonesia would be accountable
for their policy to a representative body, the elucidation of Van Mook added
that as many as possible of the ministers would be Indonesian citizens and so
would the composition of the representative body. Both sets of proposals
reiterated the need for a Commonwealth state in Indonesia.
The reactions of
both the Hague and the Republic were unclear, but they were not important,
for the elucidation never constituted a matter of discussion….
Nevertheless,
when Sjahrir returned to Batavia to resume negotiations, the issue of
recognition of the Republic exercising authority over the former Netherlands
East Indies was the primary demand in the meetings of 13, 16 and 17 March
1946….
The impasse over the recognition
issue was never resolved. When the issue was referred to discussions at
sub-committee level, the Dutch representatives used very legal arguments against the recognition of
the Republic: recognition would give rise
to international legal problems apart from the Dutch contention that the Republic
did not exercise de facto authority..
C. Critique
Considered in the most generous
light this offer could be considered to be “.. the Dutch equivalent of British
pledges of Indian independence attained by stages, and contemplated a
dominion type of relationship.”[1]
However -
Quoted from Raymond Kennedy, “Dutch
PLAN for the Indies”. Far Eastern Survey, Vol. XV, No. 7
(April 10, 1946), pp. 97-102. Pp. 99-101
The third and fourth of the itemized proposals are
very important, as they outline the Dutch plan for the government of Indonesia
itself. The supreme organs of administration in the Indies have been the
Governor-General, the Council of the Indies, the Cabinet, and the Peoples
Council or Volksraad….
The central legislature has been the main locus of
political power of the Indonesians, and out of it have come most of the
enactments which have gradually but steadily pulled Indonesia toward increasing
democracy and self-government. The statement of policy has this to say of its
future: "for the Commonwealth as a whole the creation of a democratic
representative body containing a substantial Indonesian majority is
contemplated." The old Volksraad was democratic and representative, but
only to a degree. Only thirty-eight of the sixty delegates were elected, and
the remaining twenty-two were appointed by the Governor-General. The European
population was greatly over-represented, for while Europeans formed far less
than one percent of the total population, they held twenty-five, or over forty
percent, of the seats. The Foreign Asiatics, with about two percent of the
total population, were also favored in the legislature, having five, or almost
ten percent of the delegates. The natives held half of the seats, but they
composed over ninety-seven percent of the population.
If the proposed legislature is to be both democratic and representative, a question arises with regard
to the appointive seats. Will the Governor-General continue to appoint some delegates, and if so, how many?
While appointment of delegates may not necessarily violate the principle of representativeness, it seems
hardly consonant with the basic
meaning of democracy. On the point of
Indonesian representation, we have already mentioned the probability
that, despite unitary citizenship, communal voting by ethnic blocs will he retained. This seems to follow logically from the statement that "a substantial Indonesian majority is
contemplated." No indication is
given as to how substantial a majority the Dutch have in mind.
Reform of the voting system is not even mentioned in the
statement of policy. Before the war, election of delegates to the Volksraad was carried out on the basis of an electorate severely restricted by income
and property qualifications, which affected the natives almost exclusively. Moreover, the method of election was so indirect that true mass representation was
far from achieved. Especially
indirect was the electoral procedure
for Indonesians. If a truly democratic and representative legislature is to be established in the Indies, these impediments must be removed. Another and most crucial question
which is bound to arise in relation
to the Indonesian Parliament concerns the veto power formerly exercised by the Governor-General; but this had best be considered below, along
with the other proposed powers of the Governor-General.
Position of Cabinet
The statement of policy calls for "a Cabinet
formed in political
harmony with the representative body." The prewar Indonesian Cabinet was appointed by the Governor-General, except for the Ministers of War
and Navy, who were named by the Crown.
The Governor-General in turn was
appointed by the Crown, so that the
entire central executive branch was a creature of the Netherlands Government. Contrary to the customary European principle of Cabinet responsibility to the legislature, the Indonesian Cabinet was
responsible solely to the
Governor-General. The Indonesian Parliament had no voice in the selection of Cabinet members and no means of forcing the resignation of an
unsatisfactory Cabinet, although it
might pass a vote of no confidence in
a minister. The Governor-General could act on such a vote in his discretion. Under
the proposed plan, the Cabinet, once installed, will still retain its parliamentary immunity, and the appointment of ministers will still remain in Dutch
hands; but evidently the legislature will be given a chance to pass on
the suitability of Cabinet members proposed by the Governor-General. This seems to be the sense of the clause "a Cabinet formed in political harmony
with the representative body."
The powers of
the Governor-General were immense in pre-war Indonesia, and among them the
greatest were the veto he could exercise over the acts of the Volksraad and his
right to issue executive orders having the force of law in case of emergency. He might, indeed, modify or suspend any or all of the laws of
Indonesia, if he deemed that a state
of emergency existed. Such emergency
actions of the Governor-General were subject to confirmation by the Volksraad at its next meeting; and, if the legislature voted adversely, the
Crown then arbitrated the disagreement.
The Governor-General's veto over acts of the
legislature is not mentioned in the present statement of policy, and yet it has
been perhaps the single most "undemocratic" aspect of Indonesian
government. It is, of
course, the standard bulwark against truly democratic legislative power in
every colony; even those, like Burma and Ceylon, which have advanced to a
considerable degree of home rule. The way the system has operated in the Indies
has been as follows: either the Governor-General or the Volksraad might
initiate a bill; in case of disagreement the bill, if pertaining to finances,
went to the Netherlands Parliament for approval or rejection; if not a budget
bill, the issue was resolved by a royal decree. In either case the balance of
power rested in Dutch hands, and it seems probable that a change in this system
will be demanded.
The section of the statement of policy which defines the Governor-General's special powers should also give
pause to the Indonesians.
"The representative of the Crown," it
is proposed, "shall possess under his responsibility to the Government of the Kingdom certain special powers to guarantee fundamental rights, efficient administration and sound financial management. Exactly what these special powers will be, how they will be exercised, and what means will be available to the Indonesian legislature to control them are all unanswered
questions. The matters over which the Governor-General is entitled to exercise his
special powers are so broadly defined
that they could cover almost anything. He can,
on his own initiative, invoke his unspecified special powers to guarantee
"fundamental rights, efficient
administration and sound financial
management." Any Indonesian
statesman who accepted such a blanket bill of goods, especially with the memory of the drastic use of emergency powers
in 1941 still fresh in his mind, would
be a dupe indeed. The danger is palliated not at all by the proviso that "these powers shall be exercised only when
these rights and interests are
affected," for decision as to when
the "rights and interests" are threatened rests entirely with the
Governor-General himself. While
it might be argued that the President of the United States and the chief executive officers of other democratic
nations possess such emergency powers,
these are the freely elected leaders of sovereign states; whereas the
Governor-General of Indonesia, under the proposed plan, will be an
officer appointed by the ruler of a European nation to
wield supreme authority over an Asiatic country which is trying desperately
to free itself.
By comparison
with the section just discussed, the fifth proposal
of the statement of policy is straightforward and relatively uncontroversial. It concerns civil rights. "The envisaged Constitution [of the
Commonwealth of Indonesia] . . .
shall comprise guarantees for fundamental rights such as freedom of worship, legal
equality without discrimination as to creed and race, protection of person and property, independence of the judiciary,
protection of the rights of minorities, freedom of education and freedom of opinion and expression." Some of the guarantees in this
"bill of rights" have been well established in the Indies previously.
Thus the Dutch have rightfully taken pride in their religious tolerance and
in their careful provisions for the
protection of the rights of minority native groups. Although the Chinese minority group has in the past undergone
discrimination and even persecution, the record of recent decades has shown a
swift and sweeping improvement. Legal
equality has been infringed in a sense
by differentiations in the laws, the courts,
and legal procedure; but these variations have been prescribed for the express purpose of adapting modern
concepts of justice to local, mutually dissimilar traditions and customs. As stated above, it seems likely that the principal change contemplated is
the legal reclassification of Chinese
into the same category as Europeans.
Protection of person and property is a fundamental right that could
hardly be omitted in the "bill of
rights" of any modern constitution. This provision, and the one
guaranteeing independence of the judiciary, represent no innovation.
Educational Needs
Freedom of education has not been violated in
Indonesia in the past, with the exception of an abortive attempt by the
Government in 1932 to introduce a so-called "Wild School" ordinance.
For years before this the Government had been watching with apprehension the
rapid increase of "national" schools, i.e., private schools operated
by Indonesian political and cultural societies; and this ordinance was designed
to check the growth of the movement by forbidding persons not possessing
official certificates to teach. The Taman Siswo, largest of the
national-education societies, fought the ordinance bitterly and organized a
resistance campaign against it, with the result that the ordinance was
withdrawn.
The truth is, however, that Indonesia is in less need of freedom of education than of free
education. Tuition fees have been required for all school attendance, and this
ride, combined with the insufficiency of the kept native education at an
astonishingly low level. Literacy never
exceeded ten percent in the Indies, and, although the elementary school
system began to expand rapidly during the 1930's, provisions for native education were utterly inadequate even by 1940.
Very few Indonesians ever went beyond primary school, and university education
was beyond the reach of all but an infinitesimal proportion of them. In short,
the prewar educational system for natives was scandalously poor, especially for
a country with the great natural wealth of the Indies, and for a territory
ruled by a nation with such high educational standards as the Netherlands. It
is a conspicuous shortcoming of the present Dutch statement of policy that it
does not include an outright provision for great expansion of educational
facilities and free schooling for all, at least through the primary grades.
Without tremendous improvement in education, the Indonesians cannot develop
many able leaders, and progress toward real native self-government and full
participation on all levels cannot be realized.
The most impressive of the new guarantees is that
which promises "freedom of opinion and expression." The censorship
laws of the Indies have been almost unbelievable in their repressiveness, and
the restrictions on free assembly and free speech have been almost as
bad.", Any person or group advocating independence, for example, has been
liable to prosecution for sedition, and with the passage of time there was no
softening of the rules. Just before the great debacle, in 1940, a government
spokesman in the Volksraad declared officially that anyone who raised the issue
of independence would be subject to legal punishment. Use of the word
"Indonesia" was forbidden, as was singing of the
"revolutionary" anthem, Indonesia Raya. Persons who violated
the laws against "seditious" activities were either imprisoned or
banished to remote parts of the Indies. The notorious prison camp on the Upper
Digoel River in New Guinea held hundreds of political exiles at the outbreak of
the war.
The sixth proposal outlines the Dutch plan for the
central government of the Kingdom. "The central institutions functioning
for the entire Kingdom," it is stated, "shall be composed of
representatives of the constituent parts of the Kingdom." The only
"central institution" specifically named, however, is a
"Commonwealth-Cabinet," establishment of which, with "Ministers
from the constituent parts of the Kingdom," is "contemplated."
Apparently there will be a local cabinet for each of the four divisions of the
Kingdom.
D. INDONESIAN
PROPOSALS IN ANSWER TO THE DECLARATION OF DUTCH POLICY - 13 March
1946
1. The Republic of Indonesia
shall be recognized as exercising the sovereign authority in the territory of the
former Netherlands Indies.
2. The
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia shall, if necessary, be
rendered in complete harmony with fundamental principles prevailing
in a democratic state; in so doing due consideration shall be given to
the protection of minorities.
3. In
accordance with these principles the requirements for citizenship
shall be determined on the most liberal basis possible; however,
those among the non-Indonesians who prefer to remain aliens shall not be
prevented from doing so.
4. On
the premise to be guided by public welfare, the policy followed
with respect to admittance of aliens for domicile and labor, as of investment
and operation for foreign capital, shall be the open door
policy.
5. Debts of the
Netherlands Indies and of the autonomous territories incurred prior to March, 1942, shall
for the remainder be transferred to the Republic of Indonesia.
6. Agreements
shall be concluded with the Kingdom of the Netherlands to regulate
Netherlands interests in matter of personnel, finance, economy and others in an
equitable manner.
7. For a defined period a federative union
shall be constituted, composed of the
Netherlands and Indonesia, whereby the conduct of foreign relations and of the
defense of both countries shall be entrusted to a federal institution
comprised of Dutch and Indonesian representatives.
8.
The
federal institution has
the additional task of assuring that in both states the fundamental
(human) rights shall be respected, that an
efficient administration and a sound financial management are guaranteed and the agreements referred to under
point 6 are adhered to.
9. Immediately
after this agreement becomes effective the Netherlands forces
shall be withdrawn from Indonesia. Wherever necessary, they shall be replaced by
the forces of the Republic.
10. Likewise,
general amnesty shall be granted to persons convicted or prosecuted because of political
and related offenses.
11.
The Netherlands Government
shall promote the admission of Indonesia as a
member of the UNO.
12. Pending these discussions all
military movements shall be suspended and the Indonesian Government shall
undertake to devote special attention to the
protection and evacuation of Dutch and other internees.
Quoted from Djajadiningrat, Idrus
Nasir, The
beginnings of the Indonesian-Dutch negotiations and the Hoge Veluwe talks (Cornell University.
Modern Indonesia Project. Monograph series),
Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of Far Eastern
Studies, Cornell University (1958), ASIN: B0007EG4B8 pp. 110-111