The Renville Political Principles
A The Principles Proposed by the Netherlands
and accepted by the Parties on January 17, 1948:
1. That the assistance of
the Committee of Good Offices be continued in the working out and signing of an
agreement for the settlement of the political dispute in the islands of Java,
Sumatra and Madura, based upon the principles underlying the Linggadjati
Agreement.
2. It is understood that
neither party has the right to prevent the free expression of popular movements
looking toward political organizations which are in accord with the principles
of the Linggadjati Agreement, It is further understood that each party will
guarantee the freedom of assembly, speech and publication at all times, provided
that this guarantee is not construed so as to include the advocacy of violence
of reprisals.
3. It is understood that
decisions concerning changes in administration of territory should be made only
with the full and free consent of the populations of those territories and at a
time when the security and freedom from coercion of such populations will have
been ensured.
4. That on the signing of
the political agreement provision be made for the gradual reduction of the
armed forces of both parties.
5. That as soon as
practicable after the signing of the truce agreement, economic activity, trade,
transportation and communications be restored through the co-operation of both
parties, taking into consideration the interests of all the constituent parts
of Indonesia.
6. That provision be made
for a suitable period of not less than six months nor more than one year after
the signing of the agreement during which time uncoerced and free discussion
and consideration of vital issues will proceed; at the end of this period free
elections will be held for self-determination by the people of their political
relationship to the United States of Indonesia.
7. That a constitutional
convention be chosen according to democratic procedure to draft a constitution
for the United States of Indonesia.
8. It is understood that
if, after signing the agreement referred to in item 1, either party should ask
the United Nations to provide an agency to observe conditions at any time up to
the point at which sovereignty is transferred from the Government of the
Netherlands to the Government of the United States of Indonesia, the other
party will take this request in serious consideration. The following four
principles are taken from the Linggadjati Agreement:
9. Independence for the Indonesian peoples.
10. Co-operation between
the peoples of the Netherlands and Indonesia.
11. A sovereign State on a
federal basis under a constitution which will be arrived at by democratic
processes.
12. A union between the
United States of Indonesia and other parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
under the King of the Netherlands.
B Six Additional Principles
Submitted by the Committee of Good Offices and accepted by the Parties on
January 19, 1948:
1. Sovereignty throughout
the Netherlands Indies is and shall remain with the Kingdom of the Netherlands
until, after a stated interval, the Kingdom of the Netherlands transfers its
sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. Prior to the termination of such
stated interval the Kingdom of the Netherlands may confer appropriate rights,
duties and responsibilities on a provisional federal Government of the
territories of the future United States of Indonesia. The United States of
Indonesia, when created, will be a sovereign and independent State in equal
partnership with the Kingdom of the Netherlands in a Netherlands Indonesian
Union, at the head of which shall be the King of the Netherlands. The status of
the Republic of Indonesia will be that of a State within the United States of
Indonesia.
2. In any provisional federal
Government created prior to the ratification of the constitution of the future
United States of Indonesia, all States will be offered fair representation.
3. Prior to the dissolution
of the Committee of Good Offices, either party may request that the services of
the Committee be continued to assist in adjusting differences between the
parties which relate to the political agreement and which may arise during the
interim period. The other party will interpose no objection to such a request.
This request would be brought to the attention of the Security Council of the
United Nations by the Government of the Netherlands.
4. Within a period of not
less than six months or more than one year from the signing of this agreement,
a plebiscite will be held to determine whether the populations of the various
territories of Java, Madura and Sumatra wish their territory to form part of
the Republic of Indonesia or another State within the United States of
Indonesia, such plebiscite to be conducted under observation by the Committee
of Good Offices, should either party in accordance with the procedure set forth
in paragraph 3 above request the services of the Committee in this capacity.
The parties may agree that another method for ascertaining the will of the
populations may be employed in place of a plebiscite.
5. Following the
delineation of the States in accordance with the procedure set forth in
paragraph 4 above, a constitutional convention will be convened through
democratic procedures to draft a constitution for the United States of
Indonesia. The representation of the various States in the convention will be
in proportion to their populations.
6.
Should any State decide not to ratify the constitution and desire, in
accordance with the principles of Articles 3 and 4 of the Linggadjati
Agreement, to negotiate a special relationship with the United States of
Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, neither party will object.
Quoted from Djajadiningrat, Idrus
Nasir, The
beginnings of the Indonesian-Dutch negotiations and the Hoge Veluwe talks (Cornell University.
Modern Indonesia Project. Monograph series),
Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of Far Eastern
Studies, Cornell University (1958), ASIN: B0007EG4B8 pp. 206-207
Context and Outcome
To understand the Dutch stand adopted during
the Renville and other subsequent discussions, it would also be useful to
examine the position of the United States on the Indonesia Question. As the
leading power at that time and certainly the most important member of the GOC
(UN Good Offices Committee), the views of the United States were eagerly sought
by the Dutch (and also the Republicans). Given a choice between the United
Nations and the United States, Van Mook would certainly have chosen the latter.
Reference has already been made to Van Mook's preparedness to accept American
intervention before the First Police Action. The policy pursued by the United
States, however, was ambivalent in some respects. It did not want to support a
colonial restoration in Indonesia.... At the same time … the United States gave
the impression that it did not want to see the Dutch position in Europe
weakened through the loss of political control over Indonesia. It also did not
want to see the Netherlands condemned in the United Nations for failing to
cooperate with the GOC. Indeed the United States wanted to keep the Indonesia
dispute out of the Security Council …. [T]he basically pro-Dutch stand of the
United States must be kept in the background as a possible explanation of the
Dutch intransigence in acceding to the GOC proposals in negotiations.
Van Mook's negotiating strategy at the
Renville talks was to separate the ceasefire problems from the political
discussions. The former should be settled first before political negotiations
could begin. This was in keeping with Van Mook's long-held view that insecurity
was not conducive to political talks. However this position was unacceptable to
the Republic which wanted simultaneous discussions on the two issues.
The
negotiations on the Renville were also not helped by the [Netherlands’]
delegation's attitude that the Security Council's resolutions of 1 August 1947
(calling for a ceasefire) and of 1 November 1947 (calling for no further
extension of control of territory) only imposed a moral obligation on the
parties to obey. The Netherlands delegation felt the Dutch also had a moral
obligation to provide security to the inhabitants of Indonesia in the course of
which certain military operations were essential. If a choice was to he made,
the latter obligation was more important…. When the GOC made ceasefire
proposals, these were invariably accepted by the Republican delegation without
reservation. The Netherlands delegation too did not reject the proposals but
would call for clarifications over "vague terminology ."… However, even the Netherlands delegation
admitted that the acceptance by the Republic of some GOC ceasefire proposals
without comment resulted in the awkward position that the Netherlands
delegation was in fact not negotiating with the Republic but with the GOC.
When political discussions began, the GOC
adopted the method of trying to solve the dispute arising over the interpretations
of the Linggadjati Agreement. As the Dutch delegation gave an article by
article explanation of the agreement, it became clear that there was little
point in going further in the discussions for the differences between the
Republican and Netherlands interpretations were just as wide as before….
In contrast to
the Dutch, the Republican delegation appeared to be very certain of what it
wanted out of the Renville talks: (a) de jure recognition of the
Republic's control over Java, Sumatra and Madoera (b) withdrawal of Dutch
troops and (c) any eventual agreement to be subject to international
control....
The result of
the deadlock in negotiations prompted the GOC to initiate fresh proposals. This
was the genesis of the "Christmas message" of 25 December 1947. The
contents of the message were in two parts. The first part dealt with the
ceasefire proposals: there was to be an immediate stand fast and ceasefire
order along the Van Mook line which was the extreme limit to which Dutch forces
had advanced on 4 August 1947 when the ceasefire came into effect. It also came
to be called the Status Quo Line (or SQL). Demilitarised zones would then be
established with the help of the GOC. Trade and intercourse between all areas
should resume as soon as possible. All forces on the other party's side of the
demilitarised zone or in the zone itself should move peacefully back to their
own side of the zone.
The political principles (listed in Annex 11
of the "Christmas message) consisted of eight points:
1. The GOC would assist in reaching a political
settlement for Java, Madoera and Sumatra.
2. The process of state organization then going on was to
cease forthwith.
3. Within three months of the signing of the political
agreement, the civil administrations existing on 20 July 1947 should be
restored. Dutch troops would be withdrawn to positions held on that date.
4. Both sides would reduce their armed forces after the
signing of the political agreement.
5. Normal economic activity and relationship would be
resumed.
6. Provision would be made for a suitable period (six to
twelve months after the signing of the political agreement) for uncoerced
discussions of vital issues, after which free elections would be held to enable
the people to determine their political relationship to the Republic and the
USI.
7. A constitutional convention chosen by democratic means
would be called to draft a constitution for the USI.
8. A United Nations agency would continue to supervise
matters in Indonesia till the formation of the USI.
Both the Republican and Netherlands
delegations were not pleased with the "Christmas message". The
Republic was unhappy that the ceasefire would be based on the Van Mook line.
There were fears that the political agreement would only be concluded long
after the ceasefire was accepted which would mean that the Dutch would not be
required to withdraw their troops to positions held on 20 July yet.
The Dutch
objections centred on the second and third points in Annex II: the prohibition
to form states was certainly not acceptable while the prospect of having to
withdraw to the positions held on 20 July was not calculated to win Dutch
support for the "Christmas message". The ceasefire proposals were
generally acceptable.
The effect of the "Christmas
message" was to cause the Netherlands delegation to issue a set of
counterproposals of twelve points on New Year's Day 1948 at a meeting of the
GOC, Van Mook and the Netherlands delegation. These twelve points included the
eight political principles of Annex II of the "Christmas message" plus
four other principles. However, of the original eight political principles,
four were significantly revised. They were the second, third, sixth and eighth
principles. The second was rewritten to permit the continued establishment of
federal states. The third was redrafted to include the proviso that any changes
in the administration would be made only when security was ensured. The
original sixth principle of Annex II had provided for free elections to enable
the people to determine their relationship to the Republic and the USI. This
was revised to read that the people could determine their relationship to the
USI but no reference was made to the Republic. Obviously the Dutch were not
willing to allow the people to decide whether they wanted to join the Republic.
The original eighth principle in Annex II provided for the acceptance of an
agency of supervision from the United Nations. In the revised form submitted on
1 January 1948, the Netherlands delegation merely stated that a request for
such an agency by the other party would be taken into "serious
consideration" by the Dutch.
The remaining four principles were drawn from
the Linggadjati Agreement. They were:
9.
Independence for the Indonesian peoples.
10. Cooperation
between the peoples of the Netherlands and Indonesia.
11. A sovereign state on a federal basis under a
constitution which would be arrived at by democratic processes.
12. An union
between the USI and other parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands under the
Crown of the Netherlands.
Nowhere in the twelve principles was there any
explicit mention of the Republic of Indonesia. Beel who was present when the
twelve principles were handed over also informed Van Zeeland that the
principles could not be further discussed and the Republic could "take it
or leave it".
The twelve principles were then forwarded to
the Republic for its consideration. While that was taking place, other events
were occurring that had an effect on the final outcome of the Renville
discussions. For one, the United States Government was keen to moderate the
twelve principles to make their acceptance easier for the Republic….
To help the Republic accept the twelve principles that
the Netherlands delegation handed to the Republic on 1 January 1948, the State
Department drew up seven additional points that were of considerable advantage
to the Dutch and yet met Republican demands to some extent.
In the first additional point, it was clearly
stated that the Republic would be a negara in the proposed USI.
Sovereignty in the Netherlands East Indies would remain with the Netherlands
until it was transferred to the USI after a specified interval. The Netherlands
would retain the right to confer responsibilities on a provisional interim
government as it deemed fit. When created, the USI would be sovereign and equal
to the Netherlands. Never before had the position of Netherlands sovereignty
been so clearly stated. This was the clause that sold all the other six points
to the Netherlands.
The second additional point favoured the Republic
vaguely. It provided for "fair representation" of all states within
the future USI in the provisional interim government.
The third additional point stipulated that
before the GOC was wound up, its services might be requested by either party to
assist in adjusting difficulties during the interim period. Such a request
would be placed by the Netherlands before the Security Council. This point met
the insistence of the Republic for United Nations supervision but it was
pointed out by the State Department that it also was a guarantee against
possible truce violations by the Republic.
The fourth
additional point was less favourable to the Netherlands. It provided for the
holding of free elections and plebiscites not less than six months and not more
than one year after signing the political agreement to determine the political
affiliation of states and territories with regard to the Republic. Here the
State Department was trying to restore (through the back door as it were) the
sixth point of Annex II of the "Christmas message" which provided for
the opportunity for the people of Indonesia to define their relationship with
the Republic but which was ignored by the Netherlands when submitting its
twelve political principles.
The fifth additional point provided for the
calling of a constitutional convention to draft the constitution of the USI.
The states would be represented in the convention in proportion to their
population. This would still mean that the rump Republic with its 19 million
population would have the largest delegation although Pasoendan with its 13.5
million would not be far behind.
The sixth additional point stipulated that the
constitution was to provide for a bicameral legislature for the USI as in the
United States. This point was later deleted as its adoption would have
prejudiced the right of the convention (mentioned in the fifth additional
point) to decide on a constitution of its own. The seventh then became the
sixth point.
The seventh and last additional point provided
the right for any state which did not wish to ratify the constitution and he a
co-member of the USI to negotiate a special relationship with the Netherlands.
This was simply a reaffirmation of Articles 3 and 4 of the Linggadjati
Agreement.
The seven additional points were presented to
the Dutch on 9 January 1948. [The] State Department officials applied a little
arm twisting. Marshall Aid plans for the Netherlands would be discussed on 14
January and Netherlands acceptance of the seven points would strengthen the Dutch
case. However, State Department officials also made clear that this was not to
be considered as pressure on the Netherlands government. (Certainly the stakes
involved in Marshall Aid were too important to make that financial assistance
dependent on Dutch acceptance of the seven additional points.) Nevertheless,
their non-acceptance would give rise to "further bickering".
Consultations
were held during 9-11 January. Van Mook suggested some changes. In the first
additional point, he proposed the inclusion of the participation of the USI in
a Netherlands-Indonesia Union under the Dutch crown. He had some reservations
about the plebiscite and continued involvement of the United Nations. There was
also no reference in all the seven points to defence, internal security and
economic and financial matters. However, he recommended acceptance the seven
additional points because the first point stated very clearly the sovereignty
of the Netherlands over Indonesia…. It was understood that international
supervision of the plebiscites (the fourth additional point) was not
unconditionally mandatory but dependent on the request of one of the parties.
The plebiscites were also to be limited to Java, Madoera and Sumatra. It was
also made clear to Graham that the second additional point (providing for
"fair representation" of all states within the future USI in the
provisional interim government) would become operative after the signing of the
political agreement envisaged in the additional points of the State Department.
Also the Dutch made clear that the sixth additional point (formerly the
seventh) would not prejudice the number of component states in the future
USI. With all these understandings, the
Netherlands delegation accepted the six additional points….
On 11 January, the GOC flew to Kalioerang
(near Djogjakarta) to meet Soekarno and Prime Minister Sjarifoeddin. Of the
discussions held there, the most important was the meeting of 13 January at
which the GOC interpreted the six additional points in such a way that it
eliminated all the value that the Netherlands delegation had attached to them.
The interpretation of the first additional point naturally attracted most
attention. Sjarifoeddin asked what would be the status of the Republic prior to
the ratification of the constitution of the USI. Graham replied that whatever
the status possessed by the Republic, that status was not affected by its
acceptance of the six additional points. This in effect meant that the Republic
could continue as before. Van Zeeland was also reported to have said that
acceptance by the Republic of the first additional point had no bearing
"whatsoever" on the status of the Republic it already had.
On the third additional point (acceptance of
United Nations supervision till the creation of the USI), the GOC noted that
the Netherlands was committed before the world to accept the continuance of
international good offices.
On the fourth additional point (the holding
of plebiscites), Graham stated that there would be freedom of assembly, speech
and the press because the GOC presumed that military forces would have been
reduced and he personally hoped they would have been withdrawn.
All three GOC members also agreed that there
was nothing in the six additional points to suggest that the Republic could not
continue its present foreign relations during the interim period.
Like the
Linggadjati Agreement, an elucidation was needed. However this time, it was for
the Republic. Given the GOC explanations, there could not have been strong
objections to the ceasefire proposals and the twelve principles of the
Netherlands delegation submitted on 1 January. According to … the military
adviser to the Republican negotiating team, the Republic decided to come to an
agreement with the Dutch because of the prevailing belief that the GOC would
guarantee its implementation without violence or the threat of violence by the
Dutch. Also there was the "psychological pressure" on the
pro-Republican groups in Batavia and Djogjakarta that an impasse in the negotiations
would mean war. On 14 January, the Republic declared its readiness to sign an
agreement. On 17 January, on board the Renville, the ceasefire proposals
(of the "Chrismas message") and the twelve principles were signed.
Two days later, on 19 January, the six additional principles were also
accepted.
The Netherlands delegation did not know of the
content of the Kalioerang discussions. The minutes of those meetings were only
handed to the delegation on 20 January, after the Renville agreement had been
signed. This led the Dutch to suspect some kind of chicanery and the
Netherlands government instructed its delegation to ignore the Kalioerang
minutes….
The only success of the Renville agreement
was seen in the withdrawal of 35,000 Republican combatants who were evacuated
in February 1948. Prisoners were also released by each side. In all other
aspects, the Renville agreement was not realised. Trade and normal relations
across the SQL were not resumed. Indeed the GOC had the impression that both
governments were eyeing each other across the SQL with "reserve and
suspicion". The "fair representation" of the Republic in the
interim government was problematic: how the Republic would be fairly
represented would not be known before it was clear how many states there would
be in the USI. This would in turn depend on the plebiscites. The Republic, of
course, wanted to retain its attributes of de facto sovereignty during the
interim period while the Netherlands denied it had any. There was also
disagreement over the power of the Netherlands-Indonesia Union. Discussions in
The Hague led to proposals that the Union could participate in international
relations and even be represented diplomatically. Van Mook himself could not
understand how diplomatic representation was possible. There would also be a
Union court which would act as arbitrator between persons and between states.
In defence matters, it was even suggested that the Netherlands would help the
USI in the event of war. The reverse would not be required but the USI would
provide military bases for the Netherlands. Therefore although the Union might
not be a superstate in name, it in fact was quite close to that.
The Netherlands also did not remove its
naval blockade on the Republic. There was a complete prohibition of import of
goods considered suitable for military purposes. Permits were needed for other
items like machinery, instruments, steel in various forms, steel and copper
wire, steel and iron pipes, oxygen, sulphur, asphalt, alcohol, vehicles,
aircraft, means of transport, railway, railway material, telegraph,
radio-telegraph and telephone material, fuels and lubricants and uniforms - in
short, a complete prohibition of all essential goods for the Republic.
Similarly permits were needed for almost the whole range of prevent smuggling
of exports…. Movement by sea was also
severely hampered.
The lack of progress in the post-Renville
negotiations was also complicated by various events that soured
Dutch-Indonesian relations…. Ali Boediardjo formed a Plebiscite Movement in
Batavia to prepare for the coming plebiscites promised in the Renville
agreement. The Plebiscite Movement was in part prompted by the Dutch
determination to go ahead and organise the Third West Java Conference…. Van
Mook was against the preparations for the plebiscites. In his view, plebiscites
could only be held when security was restored." All over West Java,
meetings of the Plebiscite Movement were therefore prohibited."
Quoted from Djajadiningrat, Idrus
Nasir, The
beginnings of the Indonesian-Dutch negotiations and the Hoge Veluwe talks (Cornell University.
Modern Indonesia Project. Monograph series),
Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of Far Eastern
Studies, Cornell University (1958), ASIN: B0007EG4B8 pp. 168-177
See also
- Text
and Comments on the Radio
address by Queen Wilhelmina on 7 December 1942
- Dutch Proposals for Indonesian
Settlement 6 November 1945
- Dutch Proposals for Indonesian
Settlement 10 March 1946
- Text
and critique of the Linggadjati Agreement
- Politionele acties ('police actions') - Wikipedia