Dutch Proposals for Indonesian Settlement 6 November 1945
A. TEXT OF DUTCH GOVERNMENT NINE POINT PROPOSAL of 6 November 1945
(1) A Central Indies Government consisting of a democratic representative body with a substantial majority of Indonesian members, and a Council of Ministers under a Governor-General as a representative of the Netherlands Crown. That body will govern internal affairs.
(2) Indonesia is to become a full partner in the Commonwealth, and the machinery for the Commonwealth is to be decided at a round table conference to be held as soon as possible.
(3) Suffrage will be a subject of consultation, but it will rest on adequate representation of all groups.
(4) An increase of Indonesian and other non-Netherlands citizens in the general service of the Kingdom. Regulations based on racial discrimination shall be abrogated, along with the distinction between the Netherlands and Indonesian civil service.
(5) No separate penal laws.
(6) A reform of the educational system to cut down illiteracy to a minimum.
(7) Recognition of the Indonesian language as official along with the Dutch.
(8) Encouragement of increased industrial effort by all racial groups; increased production and improved distribution of income.
(9) A strong armed force built upon militia defense, with all groups participating.
"The reconstruction of Indonesia will have to be quickly taken in hand; otherwise the general impoverishment and lawlessness will have grown to such an extent that recovery may be hardly possible," the statement said.
New York Times, November 7, 1945
B. Background – see http://www.houseofdavid.ca/queen.htm
On November 6, 1945, Lieutenant Governor-General van Mook obtained permission from his government to publish a statement on the Netherlands policy and its objectives with regard to Indonesia. These objectives were based on principles of policy laid down in Queen Wilhelmina's speech of December, 1942. The Queen's statement was interpreted to mean that in the restored pre-war Volksraad (People's Council) the Indonesians would be given a "substantial majority." Before the Japanese invasion the Indonesians were allowed to hold 30 out of a total of 61 seats. Van Mook expressed the opinion that there would be no objection for the Indonesians to have even four-fifths of the votes. He was willing to go further. The directors of departments would henceforth be "ministers." Ministries would be created, but they would remain under the jurisdiction of the Governor-General. This in effect meant that there would be no ministerial responsibility. The "Volksraad" would remain a pseudo-parliament, and the Governor-General the actual ruler in Indonesia.
These were the maximum concessions which the Dutch were willing to offer. The Dutch policy completely ignored the reality of the Republic as the embodiment of the will of the Indonesian people to be independent. In point of fact the Dutch statement was an invitation to return to the old colonial relationship.
Regarding van Mook's statement President Sukarno declared in a press conference that he was not in the least impressed by it. "It is only a going-over of the old familiar statement of the Queen." For the Republican position he referred to the Political Manifesto.
As van Mook himself admits on p. 106 in his book Indonesië, Nederland en de Wereld, the Netherlands proposal was handicapped by its vagueness "in the cardinal points on the formation of an Indonesian state."
The absolute rejection of the proposals contained in the Dutch statement of November 6, was a foregone conclusion.
Quoted from Djajadiningrat, Idrus Nasir, The beginnings of the Indonesian-Dutch negotiations and the Hoge Veluwe talks (Cornell University. Modern Indonesia Project. Monograph series), Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University (1958), ASIN: B0007EG4B8 pp. 41-42
- Text and Comments on the Radio address by Queen Wilhelmina on 7 December 1942
- Text and critique of the Linggadjati Agreement
- Text and Comments on the Renville Political Principles